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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines the effect of moral waivers on the probability of 
unsatisfactory service separation in the Marine Corps. The primary focus of this study is 
to determine whether recruits who require one or more moral waivers are significantly 
more likely to attrite. The secondary purpose of this study is to investigate whether a 
certain combination of factors or demographic characteristics exacerbate the effect of 
moral waivers. This thesis used Total Force Data Warehouse cohort files from fiscal years 
1997 to 2005. Multivariate probit models were used to analyze the effects of moral 
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The recruiting and retention challenges facing the Marine Corps continue to grow. 
Currently, the goal of the Marine Corps is to increase the end strength from 184,000 in 
2007 to 202,000 by 2011, representing a total increase of 18,000 in four years (CBO, 
2007).  In the face of a favorable civilian economy and an extended war, meeting the end 
strength goals would require the Marine Corps to increase both its accessions (recruits) 
and retention.   
Studies have shown that a one percent decrease in overall attrition saves as much 
as 2.4 million dollars in additional recruiting and training costs (CNA, 2006). The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the Marine Corps total enlisted personnel 
cost to be $56,000 per person, per year.1  The same report estimates that this increase in 
end strength will cost the Marine Corps $10 Billion in personnel costs alone.2 
It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the factors that increase the risk of 
attrition as well as the tradeoffs associated with mitigating this risk.  Some observed 
background characteristics associated with an increased risk of attrition are gender 
(female), low educational attainment, and low scores on the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery3 (ASVAB). Recruiting applicants without attrition risk factors is 
significantly more expensive than recruiting applicants who have characteristics that 
place them in a moderate risk category but still have a relatively high propensity for 
successfully completing their enlistment contract.    
In an effort to maintain a high quality all volunteer military force the Department 
of Defense (DoD) has established guidelines that prohibit individuals with certain 
characteristics to be admitted into the United States Military.  However, in certain cases 
                                                 
1 CBO cost estimates used data from Administrations 2008 budget request. 
2 CBO cost estimates included Regular Military Compensations, as well as projected recruitment and 
retention bonuses. 
3 The ASVAB is a series of 8 tests which all applicants are required to take in order to determine there 
propensity for learning various skills the test battery includes: Word Knowledge, Paragraph 
Comprehension, Mathematical knowledge, Arithmetic reasoning, General Science, Mechanical 
comprehension, Electronics information, and Auto and shop information. 
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the DoD allows individual services to deviate from these guidelines.  This gives each 
service the flexibility to recruit individuals requiring waivers of policy to serve.  These 
waivers fall into one of several categories. Medical waivers are issued to applicants with 
pre-existing conditions that may limit the individual’s ability to serve in austere or 
rigorous environments.  Physical waivers are required for individuals who do not meet 
service standards for height, weight, or fitness level.  Mental waivers are required for 
applicants who score low on the ASVAB or fail to meet educational requirements.  Moral 
waivers4 are necessary if an applicant has committed a criminal offense prior to 
enlistment. 
A. FORCE STRUCTURE 
The Marine Corps continues to struggle to find the balance between maintaining 
high physical and moral standards and meeting the manpower requirements within the 
constrains of a limited recruiting budget.  Many factors such as operational tempo, a 
strong national economy, changes in force structure, and increasing costs affect the 
Marine Corps’ acceptable level of risk in accessing applicants that are likely to not 
complete their enlistment contracts.  The performance of these high-risk individuals may 
also be affected by the economic and operational environment they serve in.  These 
factors play a role when faced with a prolonged conflict, and dynamic force structure.  
Inquiring whether those who require moral waivers serve as well as those who do not will 
be critical to meeting the operational and force structure missions of the Marine Corps. 
Examining the issue of moral waivers is important for several reasons.  Admitting 
large numbers of applicants that have violated civilian laws may have a destabilizing 
effect on retention and military order and discipline in the highly structured lifestyle of 
the military.   Requiring a moral waiver might indicate that a recruit has a sub-par moral 
character that might emerge in a high stress combat situation.  Additionally, the 
likelihood of these pre-service offenders re-offending once in the military must be 
evaluated.  An influx of criminals into the volunteer force may damage the military’s 
                                                 
4  See Appendix A for complete list of Offenses that the Marine Corps requires a moral waiver for or 
does not allow a waiver for.  
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public image and cause higher quality recruits (or adult influencers) to steer away from 
military service, or drive out those already in the service reducing the overall quality of 
the service, thus further complicating the efforts to reach manning goals. 
These potential effects must be weighed against the possibilities that the majority 
of those who require moral waivers are otherwise high quality applicants.  In some cases 
a moral waiver maybe an indication of an assertive committed individual that will 
outperform peers in a military environment.  Additionally, applicants requiring waivers 
generally have lower opportunity cost in civilian life and can be recruited and retained at 
a lower cost than those with greater civilian opportunities; thus making the recruiting of 
ex-offenders a beneficial program for the Marine Corps.  An additional benefit to the 
recruit is the potential to enter an organization in which they can excel and potentially 
earn more that what they would have in the civilian market.  Society as a whole benefits 
from both a stronger military and the increased productivity of moral waiver applicants.   
To balance the two sides of the moral waiver issue the Marine Corps applies a 
“Whole Person concept” approach to the granting of waivers.  “Under this concept, an 
applicant’s qualifications are compared with past performance with the intent of 
calculating potential effectiveness in the Marine Corps.” (MCO P1100.72C, 2004) Before 
a decision is made to grant or deny a waiver the severity and circumstances of the legal 
infraction is weighed against other observable traits such as ASVAB scores, physical 
fitness, and educational attainment.  Additionally, any level of the recruiting chain may 
deny a waiver but only the designated approval authority can grant an applicant a moral 
waiver5.  This means that if an individual has committed a pre-service felony, the 
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) must approve 
the moral waiver. However, if the Commanding Officer of the Recruiting District (MCD) 
feels that the applicant represents too high of a risk, the waiver can be denied at that 
level.  But if the MCD Commanding Officer feels the applicant possesses other qualities 
that make up for the prior offense then the waiver is forwarded.  Each Command level 
                                                 
5 See Appendix B for waiver authority levels. 
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makes an independent assessment of the applicant’s situation until it reaches the 
approving authority for final dispensation.     
Obviously there is no easy solution to granting moral waivers. The answer does 
not lie in a carte blanche decision to either let all ex-offenders serve or bar them all from 
service. Determining the appropriate place to draw the line at which granting a moral 
waiver is favorable for the service, the individual, and society is imperative to 
maintaining a well-manned and effective volunteer force.  Finding what observable 
individual characteristics indicate that an applicant has overcome a past moral 
transgression is a difficult question and the focus of this study. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
1. Primary Research Question 
Do accessions that require one or more moral waivers have significantly higher 
attrition rates in the Marine Corps?   
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 a. What combinations of background characteristics exacerbate the effect of 
moral waivers? 
 b. Are individuals who are granted moral waivers more likely to separate for 
misconduct?  Are there differences in attrition rates by demographics (gender, race, 
marital status, dependents)? 
 c. Has the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), affected the rate of 
attrition for waiver recipients? 
 d. Does a higher Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score mitigate the 
effect of waivers on attrition rates? 
 e. What effects do variables such as age at enlistment, number of 
dependents, race, gender, or term of enlistment has on attrition? 
 f. Does recruiting from Marine Corps Recruiting District (MCD) or Marine 
Corps Recruiting region (MCR) have an impact on waiver related attrition rates?   
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C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
This research will examine the differences in attrition rates and unsatisfactory 
separations for recruits with moral waivers compared to those who access without any 
waivers. The analysis will not stop at first term attrition, but will focus on unsatisfactory 
separation at any point during a recruit’s career. This is done for two reasons; first, few 
unsatisfactory service separations occur after the first four years of service, and there may 
only be a weak correlation between pre-service conduct and mid service separation.  
Second, the effects of career force6 attrition are significantly greater than first term 
attrition, because they are seen as the stable manning base on which accession and 
retention decisions are made.  Additionally, the negative effects of un-satisfactory service 
by senior Marines on junior Marines are profound.  For these reasons, examining the 
factors of all unsatisfactory service separations is critical. Focusing solely on first-term 
attrition would ignore the potentially bigger problem of career recruits separating at 
critical points where replacement is harder from the point of view of the military. 
This study also examines those who completed one contract, but received an 
unsatisfactory reenlistment code.  The research examines enlisted accessions, waivers, 
and separations data obtained from the Marine Corps Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) for fiscal years 1999 to 2005.  The time of year a recruit ships to boot camp, will 
not be examined because this is not seen as an indicator of attrition itself.  Brookshire and 
Hattiangadi (2006) found that recruits who enter training during the summer months 
(June, July, August, and September) have significantly lower entry-level training 
attrition.  This seasonal effect may be related to the high percentage of graduating high 
school seniors that report to boot camp in those months, as apposed to the high 
percentage of less qualified applicants (potentially high school dropouts) accessing in 
other months.     
                                                 
6 Career Force is a term used by Marine Corps Manpower planners to designate those Marines that 
have successfully completed an initial enlistment and are considered fully qualified and likely to re-enlist 
again.  They represent the more senior proportion of the force. 
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2. Limitations 
All waivers are initiated from information voluntarily disclosed by the applicant 
and recruiter or the result of police record checks. This creates a potential for a self 
reporting bias on the part of applicants. Even recruiters who are struggling to meet 
recruiting goals may have an incentive to underreport behavior that triggers a waiver. 
This bias could result in significant under- or over-estimation of the effects of moral 
waivers on attrition.  If a significant number of those who undergo attrition should have 
received waivers but failed to report conduct that would lead to a waiver, the overall 
effects of waivers on attrition could be seriously underestimated. However, if more 
serious or more frequent offenders tend to report behavior leading to a waiver, then the 
effects of the moral waivers on attrition could be overestimated. 
The effect of this self-reporting bias was addressed in an August 2006, GAO 
report that reviewed DoD’s need for better data on possible recruiting irregularities7.  The 
GAO noted that, while DoD-wide accessions decreased by eight percent from 243,544 to 
215,198 from FY 2004 to 2005, the number of allegations of recruiter irregularities 
increased by 66 percent from 4,400 to 6,600 during the same period. The DoD 
nationwide rate of recruiters with substantiated allegations in FY 2005 was 4.7 percent of 
the 13,421 recruiters on the street. The Marine Corps rate of substantiated allegations was 
considerably lower at 1.2 percent. This indicates that not only is the occurrence of 
recruiter fraud low, but that Marine recruiters screen and report potential issues more 
closely than other services.  Therefore, the moral waiver incidence in the Marine Corps 
should have a high degree of accuracy.     
The same study also found that Marine Corps applicants are also less likely to 
withhold prior infractions from recruiters without detection.  The GAO cited several 
potential reasons for this. First, Marine recruiters have the longest formal school 
compared to all other services, thus giving them a longer time and more opportunities to 
identify potential behavioral problems.  Second, Marine applicants undergo a very 
                                                 
7 GAO defined irregularities as all allegations of misconduct or malpractice made by an applicant, 
agency, or parent even with out substantiation. 
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intense “moment of truth” after arriving at one of the Marine Corps Recruit depots 
(MCRD).  During this interview the applicants are treated like recruits not applicants.  
The GAO noted that this approach seems to be very effective at revealing additional 
reasons for waivers.  This study finds that almost four percent (11,205) of all waivers 
granted are requested by the MCRD following the “moment of truth.”    
This study only looked at data collected from waivers that were approved on 
applicants that reported to recruit training.  No data was analyzed on waivers that were 
requested and not approved or on individuals that received a waiver while in the Delayed 
Entry Program (DEP) and subsequently left the DEP before reporting to recruit training.  
While pre-service attrition is an important area of research, this study focuses on attrition 
that occurs during and after initial training due to the monetary and non-monetary cost to 
both the recruiting command and the operating forces. 
3. Assumptions 
In addition to the supported assumption that the self-reporting bias is relatively 
small, this study also assumes that it is consistent from year to year.  It is possible that 
changing economic and operational factors may affect the degree of self-reporting bias 
over time.  However, the GAO 1999 report on improving the military’s screening of 
criminal records revealed that there were no significant time effects on the rate of self 
reporting of prior infractions. 
This study also assumes that the Marines Corps’ separation policies are uniformly 
applied across the entire service. Changes in Commanding Generals (CG) can have a 
dramatic effect on the way separation policy is applied to thousands of Marines.  If a CG 
establishes an informal policy asserting that every available leadership and disciplinary 
action be employed before a Marine is processed for discharge, then not only will the 
time between offenses and separation dramatically increase but there is the potential that 
thousands of separations packages may never be submitted even though the situation is 
within the established separation criteria. Because the Marine Corps grants such latitude 
to commanders to deal with the discipline and conduct of their units, a single senior 
commander can have a significant effect on overall attrition rates.  
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This study attempts to deal with this problem by capturing those who have 
completed a four-year enlistment but received unsatisfactory re-enlistment codes.  The 
two primary reasons for this are: (1) the vast majority of Marines who receive 
unsatisfactory re-enlistment codes should have been separated, but were retained due to 
external factors such as operational tempo or a commander’s discretion; (2) the non-
monetary cost of the eventual separation or non-reenlistment of these individuals may be 
greater the later in the career they separate8.  This implies that the effect of retaining 
recruits whose conduct warrants separation may be more detrimental to a unit than 
separating them without a replacement.   
D.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II of this study will review prior studies that have addressed attrition and 
its correlation to waivers. Chapter III will describe the data files and define the dependent 
and independent variables used in the analysis.  Chapter IV will describe the data and 
conduct a preliminary investigation of summary statistics for the variables of interest. 
Chapter V presents the analytical regression models used to predict the effects of each 
variable on the likelihood of attrition. Chapter VI provides conclusions and 
recommendations based on the analysis. 
 
                                                 
8  Non-monetary costs are considered to be leadership’s time spent on disciplinary, additional 
administrative tasks, negative effect on other Marines, and a lack of return on investment from poor 
performance.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND POLICY ISSUES 
1. Overview 
All branches of the military need an ongoing influx of manpower and therefore 
must take into account the causes of attrition.  However, it has only been in recent years 
that the quantity and type of data necessary to evaluate the various factors leading to 
attrition have become available for serious study.  The progression from focusing on 
demographic characteristics such as gender, race, education, and aptitude scores has been 
hampered by a lack of consistent data.  But, several studies dating back to 1999 show that 
the GAO has addressed the need to standardize the practices and policies the services use 
to collect data.   
2. Data Issues 
In February of 1999 the GAO released two separate reports that highlighted the 
importance of improved data collection in proper recruit screening and in lowering the 
attrition rate.  In a testimony presented to the Senate subcommittee on Personnel for the 
Armed Forces, Mark Gebicke, GAO Director of Military Operations and Capabilities 
Issues Affairs Division, cited recommendations made in four previous GAO reports9.  
One of the three recommendations he highlighted to congress was to improve the 
medical, physical and criminal screening of incoming recruits (Gebicke, 1999).  During 
                                                 
9 The four reports cited by Director Gebicke include: 
Military Recruiting: DoD Could Improve Its Recruiting Selection and Incentives System 
(GAO/NSIAD-98-58, Jan. 30 1998). 
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History Screening (GAO/NSIAD-99-53, 
Feb. 23 1999). 
Military Attrition: DoD Could save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-
97-39, Jan. 15, 1997). 
Military Attrition: Better Date, Coupled With Policy changes, Could help the services Reduce Early 
Separations (GAO/NSIAD-98-213, Sep. 15 1998). 
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his testimony he acknowledged that the DoD had made progress in recruit screening by 
using fingerprint screening to find possible criminal records hidden under alias.  
Every service relies primarily on applicants self-reporting a criminal history, and 
the GAO’s 1999 report found that the services are providing up to 14 opportunities to 
disclose information to seven different officials. However, there are several obstacles to 
gathering complete data on an applicant’s criminal history.  First, federal, state, and local 
policies greatly restrict the release of criminal behavior by minors. Second, delays in 
obtaining information on criminal histories often result in applicants having already been 
shipped to recruit training forcing officials to separate them from active duty for fraud.  
Finally, in accordance with federal regulations (28 C.F.R. 20.32), the federal database 
does not contain records of minor offenses, such as minor traffic violations or 
drunkenness (GAO, 1999).  Therefore, for several categories of waivers there may be no 
administrative ways to investigate infractions.   
Putka et al. (2004) compared an Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire 
(EPSQ) given to Marines in service requesting security clearances against enlistment 
contracts to determine the number of applicants that withheld information at the time of 
enlistment.  They found that in a sample of 3,430 Marines, 30 had admitted to adult 
felonies and received waivers for them, but 11 additional Marines admitted to having 
committed a pre-service adult felony but did not receive a waiver for it. Because the 
Marine Corps requires waivers for any felony, the conclusion is that this information was 
withheld from officials. 
3. Policy Issues 
The issue of recruiting pre-service offenders was addressed by Michael Boucai in 
his paper “Balancing Your Strengths against Your Felonies: Considerations for Military 
Recruitment of Ex-Offenders.”  This article looked at the effectiveness of the current 
DoD practices for assessing candidates with legal infractions that require a moral waiver 
in order to enter military service.  Additionally, it addressed the potential benefits to the 
services, ex-offenders, and society in general if the military took a more candid and 
proactive approach to recruiting ex-offenders.  The author cited numerous government 
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and military studies to illustrate the possible degree of unreported infractions the military 
is passively allowing.  By adding this estimate to the growing number of accessions that 
received moral waivers the author illustrates that the military is already currently 
enlisting thousands of ex-offenders.     
Boucai concludes that the military recruits thousands of known criminals, and that 
this figure may be an understatement, since the military potentially  fails to detect half of 
those who should receive waivers. In his words: “the military’s current system, based on 
‘winks and nods’, does not allow for the development of strategies that will get the most 
benefit from this growing population.” This article also addresses the issue of trying to 
determine the costs and benefits of recruiting those with a history of violating the law and 
the long-term societal benefits associated with the full re-integration into society of ex-
offenders.  Military service helps mitigate the “…death sentence in the job market”10 that 
often accompanies conviction of a serious crime.  This article draws attention to the 
implications of recruiting individuals with criminal histories for the entire society, not 
only from the military’s point of view.  
By not attempting to estimate a value for the potential benefits of targeting ex-
offenders, the author stays clear of the numerous measurement bias problems that would 
be associated with extensive empirical measurements.  The author also stays within the 
current and generally accepted definitions of satisfactory service.  This allows the article 
to make its point that the benefits to society, the service, and the individual should be 
considered without getting mired in the validity and assumptions of quantifying these 
abstract aspects.  
The article does not address the fact that the military’s current criteria of 
evaluating the “whole person” takes into account other factors that affect the individual’s 
chance of successfully completing their enlistment.  An applicant with one felony 
conviction that has completed high school, has a high AFQT score, and has no 
dependants, has a different risk of attriting compared to a high school dropout, with a low 
AFQT score, three dependents and a felony conviction.  In this case, the first applicant 
                                                 
10 D.C Congressional Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton. 
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would be given favorable consideration for accession, not based on a “wink and a nod,” 
but on the total sum of their observable traits that demonstrate a risk of attrition.   This 
criterion not only benefits the service but also increases the chances that society and the 
individual will maximize the potential benefits. For individuals with behavioral problems 
entering a culture with standards so rigid that they fail to meet them, may cause more 
harm than good. This scenario will only create a need for additional disciplinary actions 
leading to additional barriers for the individual to overcome. In addition, dishonorable 
separation may harm an individual’s chances of succeeding in the civilian market. The 
article does point out that the military has an obligation to screen those who demonstrate 
characteristics that could put them at risk of unsatisfactory service. 
The article raises several valid arguments for the inclusion of ex-offenders into 
the military’s target recruiting population but does not offer any means to accomplish this 
in a more effective way. In addition, the policy considerations only address the potential 
benefits without an evaluation of the potential negative spillover effects from a policy 
change.   
B. BOOT CAMP ATTRITION 
1. Overview 
In the 2006 study “Emerging Issues In the USMC Recruiting: Comparing 
Relative Attrition Risk Among Marine Corps Recruits” the CNA attempted to group the 
Marine Corps accessions into risk categories by taking a look at both demographic and 
contract-related factors.  This study analyzed trends in the Marines Corps boot camp 
attrition using accession cohort data files from fiscal year (FY) 1992 to 200511.  The data 
set contained 339,843 male and 23,800 female accessions.  The study analyzed the 
attrition rates for each gender separately.  
 
                                                 
11 The study defined boot camp attrition as separation from one of the MCRDS within 6 or 12 months 
of accession. 
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The data used for this study contained over 363,643 accessions over 13 years, 
accounting for over 84 percent of all Marine Corps accessions.  This provided a large 
statistical base to analyze attrition.  Additionally, by only evaluating those risk groups 
that contained more than 500 accessions for males and 200 for females the authors 
reduced the likelihood of small sample sizes within a particular group driving their 
results.   
The authors limited the study to recruits that signed four-year contracts, which 
represented 84 percent of the sample. However, it should be noted that recruits who sign 
longer enlistment contracts are usually entering more technical occupations that also have 
higher educational and AFQT score requirements.  The majority of the 68,991 accessions 
removed from the study would have been predominantly high quality applicants recruited 
as seniors.  As a result, the study does not generate any implications for the attrition of 
this subsample.  
The study employed an extensive list of controls. In particular, to control for 
educational background, the study separated the sample into three educational tiers. TIER 
I-H included high school diploma graduates, undergraduate and/or graduate degree 
holders, and professional nursing degree holders. TIER I-OTHER included recruits who 
received diplomas through adult education and first-semester-college recruits. TIER II/III 
included recruits who were home-schooled, received alternative credentials or certificates 
of completion, and high school dropouts. In addition, the study included two categories of 
ability based on AFQT scores. The first group included those with AFQT scores of 50 
and above (Categories I, II, and IIIA), whereas the second group included those with 
AFQT scores below 50 (Categories IIIB and IV).  The study also included controls for 
age and an indicator for whether the recruit met the weight-for-height retention standards. 
In addition, a number of controls for the type of contract and accession were also 
included. First, the study controlled for the time that a recruit spent in the Delayed Entry 
Program (DEP). This was entered as a category that indicated whether the recruit spent 
three or more months in DEP. In addition, the study controlled for the time of the year 
when the recruit accessed — October, November, December, or January (ONDJ), 
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February, March, April, or May (FMAM), or June, July, August, or September (JJAS). 
Finally, the study controlled for whether the recruit signed up while being a senior in high 
school.  
The authors acknowledge that other studies have found factors such as race, 
ethnic background, and time of month a contract is signed to have a significant 
correlation to attrition. However, these factors were not considered.  The authors 
contended that by including those additional variables, the classification groups would 
have become too small to statistically analyze.  They also contend that the criteria they 
chose fit closely with the groups recruiters already target. 
The authors admit that results are historically based and theorize that they may be 
subject to a time effect. However, the authors note that they found little fluctuation in 
group ranking over time.  They also admit that recent upward trends in attrition seen in 
their cohort data are in line with historical seasonality and that there is insufficient data to 
indicate any true short term changes. 
In order to determine the effect each variable had on attrition, they performed a 
logistic regression on both male and female recruits separately. Table 1 presents the 
marginal effects on attrition as related to the omitted category in each section.  
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Table 1.   Estimated effects on boot camp attrition: Accessions from FY 92’ 
through 2005 (adapted from Brookshore, Hattiangadi, 2006) 
Independent Variable Men Women 
Tier I 
Tier I, Other 
Tier II/III 
-0.070  ** 
-0.022 ** 
               Ommitted


















3 or more months in DEP -0.018 ** -0.035  ** 
17-19 years if age at accession 





Met retention height-for-weight standard -0.039 ** -0.010  
Signed enlistment contract as a senior -0.012 ** -0.018  ** 












-0.058  ** 
* This table shows marginal effects from a logit regression for boot camp attrition.   The 
marginal effects are relative to the omitted category. Regressions also included fixed fiscal 
year effects.  All recruits had 4-year initial enlistment contracts. 
** Indicated statistical significance at the 5-percent level. 
*** All female recruits go to boot camp at MCRD Parris Island. 
  
 
 Of the 9 categories of variables they include in the regressions, the first seven 
characteristics were used to create 288 possible combinations an applicant could possess. 
The results presented were from groups that had at least 500 accessions, reducing the 
number of groups to 78 but still accounting for 94 percent of the original male sample.  
The female results were limited those groups that had 200 accessions, creating 29 groups 
accounting for 83 percent of the original female sample.  These groups were then ranked 
by likelihood of attrition for male and female recruits separately.  
By grouping the above characteristics, this study created a tool that recruiters can 
use to assess the relative attrition risk a given applicant has based on historical analysis.  
This allows recruiters to better allocate their time and resources on those applicants who 
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have the best chance to successfully complete boot camp.  It also provides recruiters with 
a tool to identify those who are at high risk and take steps to mitigate them. This 
increases the recruiters’ potential to identify and recruit successful Marines.      
For both male and female recruits the study found that the applicants with the 
lowest risk of attrition had the following characteristics:  
1. Signed contracts as seniors  
2. Shipped to boot camp in the months from June to January  
3. Were in education TIER I and mental category I-IIIA  
4. Met weight standards 
The group of factors that posed the most significant attrition risk for male recruits 
were: 
1. Shipped from October to May 
2. Spent less then 3 months in the DEP 
3. Were in educational TIER I and Mental category IIIB-IV or Educational 
TIER II-III and mental category I- IIIA 
4. Contracted at 20+ years of age 
For Females the highest risk of attrition was correlated with: 
1. Shipped from October to May 
2. Did not contract as High School Senior 
3. Were in educational TIER I and Mental category IIIB-IV 
4. Shipped at 20+ years of age  
 
By evaluating male and female recruits separately, the authors accounted for the 
significant difference between attrition factors for men and women as well as identified 
factors common to both groups such as contracting as a senior.  While overall female 
attrition is almost double that of males, females who do not meet height and weight 
standards do not have a significantly higher attrition rate than those who do meet this 
standard.  This again allows recruiters to better target their recruiting efforts. 
The authors acknowledge that there are many other explanatory variables that are 
highly correlated to boot camp attrition.  However they chose to limit this study to those 
variables that could be easily grouped, would provide group sizes large enough to be 
statistically analyzed, and match criteria that recruiters already used to screen applicants.  
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Based on these findings this study makes two recommendations: first, that the 
Marine Corps increase its focus on contracting applicants as seniors in high school; and 
second, that keeping those at a higher risk of attrition in the DEP longer may mitigate the 
other attrition risk factors. The correlation to some of the explanatory variables is very 
strong with no evidence of statistical tests that support their significances independently. 
For example, those who sign a contract as seniors in high school are systematically very 
likely to spend more then 90 days in the delayed entry program, be 17-19 years old, and 
be TIER I high school grads. Additional research may provide useful information by 
identifying characteristics that mitigate the risk of accepting older, lower scoring 
applicants after high school.12  
C.   EARLY SERVICE AND FIRST TERM SEPARATION 
1. Overview 
A great deal of attention has been given to the factors that affect attrition beyond 
the time line of initial training.  While training attrition is costly and affects readiness, the 
effects of attrition on the operating force can be magnified by fleet losses. First, in 
training attrition the Marine Corps is not fully financially invested in the applicant, so 
money not yet spent on that individual’s training is not lost as a result of their attrition.  
Second, operational units have not begun to rely on the skill sets and performance of 
these individuals.  This effect is demonstrated by the fact the fleet attrition usually takes 
longer and consequently creates a longer gap in manning than the more streamlined 
training attrition cycle.  
Fleet attrition may also be driven by different factors than training attrition.  After 
the early separations arising from the physical and psychological adjustments that take 
place during initial training, more subtle factors may have a greater effect in the absence 
of the rigid environment of the training environment.  For example, Putka et al (2004) 
find that during the first three months of service 99.9% of all Marine Corps attrition is 
                                                 
12 Additional characteristics can include work history, race, family composition, etc. 
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due to non-moral factors but by 15 to 18 months of service 56.4% of all Marine attrition 
is attributable to moral separations (Putka et al., 2004 pg 15).  
2.  Eighteen Month Attrition 
Demographic factor that affect 18-month moral and non-moral attrition in the 
Marine Corps are similar to those that drive boot camp attrition.  Brookshire and 
Hattiangadi (2006) found that white female high school graduate recruits with AFQT 
categories III-B or below had the highest risk of attrition from initial training.  However, 
18-moth attrition rates for moral and non-moral causes were lower for Marines that were 
classified as Education Tier I than those in tier II or III.13  For Tier I, the 18-month moral 
attrition rate was 3.4 percent while for Tier III, the moral attrition rate was 14.3 percent. 
For education Tier II, the non-moral attrition rate was 23.3 percent with only 12.5 percent 
attributed to tier one Marines (Putka et al., 2004, pg. 18). 
Surprisingly, individuals that had a body mass index (BMI) that was considered to 
be underweight had higher moral and non-moral attrition rates at 18-months of service in 
the Marines Corps and in the entire DoD.14  Marines with a BMI in the overweight 
category had a 3.1% moral attrition rate and 12.3% for non-moral attrition, while those in 
the normal range were at 3.9 and 12.5 percent respectively. The underweight categories 
had rates of 4.3 and 14.7 percent, respectively (Putka et al., 2004 pg 18).15  
Studying 18-month attrition rates indicates that applicants with no pre-service 
transgressions (thus not requiring a waiver) had the lowest attrition rates.  Those that had 
no waiver but had committed pre-service offenses had statistically higher moral and non-
moral attrition rates than those who committed these offenses and received a waiver for 
it.  As seen in Table 2 the attrition percentage rates for both moral and non-moral reasons 
                                                 
13 Education Tier I includes high school graduates, whereas Tiers II and III include those who receive 
alternative credentials for high school completion, and those who drop out of high school. 
14BMI is calculated by dividing weight in pounds (lbs) by height in inches (in) squared and 
multiplying by a conversion factor of 703.  According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), a BMI 
below 18.5 is considered underweight, a BMI of 18.5 – 24.9 is considered normal, a BMI of 25.0 – 29.9 is 
overweight, and a BMI of 30.0 and above is classified as obese. 
15 Obese Marines had attrition rates of 2.3% (moral) and 16.1% (non-moral), but the sample size used 
to derive these rates was relatively small (only 709 separations). 
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that are statistically different from those with no transgressions are found in the violation 
but no waiver category of each waiver group.    
Table 2.   18-Month Attrition Rates by Pre-Service Transgression (adapted 
from Putka et al., 2004)16   
    Moral Attrition  Other Attrition 
Pre-Service Transgression /  









Minor Traffic Violations        
No Law Violations 3,385 2.8   10.5   
    Violations-No Waiver 849 4.8   1.74**   1.49 11.8   1.14  1.02 
Waiver 43 5.4   1.99   1.45 14.6   1.46  1.27 
        
Serious Traffic Violations        
No Law Violations 3,390 2.8   10.5   
Violations-No Waiver 189 8.3   3.15**   2.26* 12.0   1.16  1.02 
Waiver 28 4.3   1.58   1.18 18.5   1.93  1.74 
        
Minor Non-Traffic Violations        
No Law Violations 3,386 2.8   10.5   
Violations-No Waiver 373 5.8   2.15**   1.69 13.3   1.31  1.20 
Waiver 20 0.0   0.00   0.00 15.0   1.50  1.37 
        
Serious Non-Traffic Violations        
No Law Violations 3,368 2.8   10.5   
Violations-No Waiver 201 7.1   2.65**   2.29* 17.0   1.75**  1.56*
Waiver 173 5.9   2.15*   1.78 12.2   1.18  1.03 
        
Juvenile Felony Violations        
No Law Violations 3,387 2.8   10.5   
Violations-No Waiver 29 4.0   1.45   1.31 14.3   1.42  1.36 
Waiver 52 4.5   1.65   1.39 14.3   1.42  1.36 
        
Adult Felony Violations        
No Law Violations 3,389 2.8   10.5   
                                                 
16 The asterisks indicate in-service deviance rates that are significantly different from those with no 
pre-service transgressions. * indicates significance at the 5% level (two-tailed); ** indicates significance at 
the 1% level (two-tailed). 
eB Raw – Odds ratios without demographic controls in logistic regressions.        
eB Control – Odds ratios controlling for demographic variables in logistic regressions. 
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Violations-No Waiver 11 0.0 - - 9.1 - - 
Waiver 30 8.0   3.02   2.58 17.9   1.85  1.43 
        
Marijuana Use        
No Drug/Alcohol Use 3,035 2.1   10.4   
Marijuana Use-No Waiver 562 7.6   3.83**   3.30** 14.1   1.42*  1.30 
Waiver 1,112 4.5   2.22**   2.13**  11.2   1.09  1.12 
 
3.  First Term Attrition 
DEP, boot camp, and early service attrition represent a significant loss of 
investment to the Marine Corps, because the service has not recouped any significant 
portion of its initial investment. Unplanned separation at any point of service is costly for 
several reasons.  First, the Marine Corps’ training investment does not end after entry 
level and MOS training.  Almost as soon as a new Marine arrives, additional investments 
in on-the- job training, leadership, and technical training begin.  Therefore, even as the 
service recoups its initial investment, it continues to reinvest on further training. 
Therefore, the break-even point indicating the minimum time of service required to 
recoup the training investments is pushed out even farther.  Second, late term separation 
has a significant impact on a unit’s mission capabilities.  It takes three years to replace an 
NCO with three years of experience that separated just before the end of his first term.  
That NCO takes with them experiences and qualifications that are accumulated during 
their time in the service.  Finally, a senior Marine with unsatisfactory service may have a 
negative impact on junior Marines, since superiors often lead by example.  An NCO in a 
supervisory role may unfavorably tip the scales for marginal Marines, and may also 
contribute to a non-reenlistment decision from high-performing Marines, thus magnifying 
a unit’s personnel shortcomings. 
Etcho (1996) looked at the effects of moral waivers on first-term unsuitability 
attrition.  He found that for cohorts in FY 1988 to FY 1990 the characteristics that affect 
fist term attrition were similar to those of boot camp attrition.  The largest overall 
demographic predictor he identified was educational tier.  Those that were not high 
school graduates had a 10.05 higher probability of attrition for unsatisfactory service 
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before the completion of their first contract compared to high school graduates.  
Similarly, those in the Category IV mental group had a 7.41 higher attrition probability 
that those in mental group Category I or II.   
Table 3.   Predicted Probability of Unsuitability Attrition for Marine Corps 
Cohorts Combined (adapted from Etcho, 1996)17 























Less than 3 Non traffic offenses 
More than 3 Non traffic Offenses 




















* Significant  at .01 ** Significant at .05  *** Significant at .10 
 
These findings were similar to other studies analyzing attrition at different time 
horizons.  While this study did not look at any contract- or service-related variables, such 
as time in DEP or whether a contract was signed while the recruit was a high school 
                                                 
17 Naval Postgraduate School thesis. Etcho used 126,652 non-prior service accessions during fiscal 
years 1988-1991. The data were obtained from DMDC MEPCOM files. 
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senior, the results for demographic and waiver characteristics were similar to those found 
by Means (1983), Fitz (1998), and Flyer (1995). 
The issue of pre-service drug use and its potential effect on attrition has been a 
significant topic in recent years.  In June of 2005 an action memo to the Chief of Naval 
Personnel from the Personnel Readiness and Community Support Division Command 
(PERS-6), Millington TN stated that “In accordance with the 2004 Chief of Naval 
Operations tasking, the DoD needs to reduce the Navy’s rates of drug attrition, overall 
attrition, and recruit higher quality individuals” (CNO, 2004). PERS-6 found that, of the 
4,320 recruits that had previously tested positive for drugs, 2,028 attrited before 
completing their first contract, and that 85.6% (1,737) of those separations were due to 
testing positive for drugs while on active duty.  Based on these findings, PERS-6 
recommended that the Navy Recruiting Command “immediately cease enlisting subject 
individuals” (PERS-1, 2006). 
However, a follow-on study in 2006 conducted by Andrew Jones and Geoffrey 
Fedak sponsored by the Navy Personnel Research Studies and Technical Division Bureau 
of Naval Personnel (NPRST/PERS-1) titled “A Brief Analysis of Pre-service Drug Abuse 
Waiver Attrition” concluded that the PERS-6 report “while technically accurate, does not 
afford decision makers with a comprehensive view of this issue and potentially offered 
misleading data to support their position” (Jones & Fedak, 2006).  Table 4 presents the 
small percentages of those with pre-service drug use that separated for disciplinary 
reasons.  The table indicates that 87.6 percent of the pre-service drug users had 12 or 
more years of education and possessed an above-average AFQT score of 59.9 (Jones & 
Fedak, 2006).  Furthermore, they found that all pre-service drug users had above average 
performance markings and that 75 percent of the E-5 and above sailors received advance 
promotion recommendations on their performance evaluations (Jones & Fedak, 2006).  
They assert that, while there is an increased risk of attrition associated with pre-service 
drug use, these recruits have many positive attributes, including  above-average aptitude 
and performance (for those who remain in service) and lower costs of recruiting.  
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Table 4.   Navy Enlistees with Positive Pre-service Drug Tests Separating 
Prior to Completing their First Term of Enlistment (adapted from Jones & 
Fedak, 2006).   
Narrative Description Frequency Percent 
Pattern of Misconduct 29 1.1% 
Misconduct 12 .4% 
Disability 12 .4% 
Personality Disorder 11 .4% 
Court Martial 24 .9% 
Completion of Service 107 3.9% 
Reduction of Service 21 .8% 
Does not total 100%. Insignificant cases not shown. (N= 4,320) 
 
D. MEASURING IN-SERVICE DEVIANCE 
1. Overview 
In addition to the substantial monetary cost directly attributed to attrition, 
unsatisfactory service is associated with considerable non-monetary costs, such as 
decreased unit morale and instability in the force structure resulting from gaps in 
performance by those serving in an unsatisfactory manner (Laurence, 1993).   While it 
may be hard to quantify some of the costs of unsatisfactory service that is due to in-
service deviance, some recent studies have attempted to measure it along with early 
separation. 
Putka et al. (2004) investigated the effects of in-service deviance and 
unsatisfactory separation through the first 18 months of service. This study analyzed 
service records for 80,944 enlisted members from all four services (14,393 from USMC) 
for any evidence of in-service legal actions such as substance abuse, court martial, or 
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non-judicial punishment. The research revealed that, after 18 months of service, 68.9% of 
Marines with two or more disciplinary actions against them were still in service 
compared to 85.2% of their counterparts without a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) or 
courts-martial (Putka et al., 2004). Additionally, 22.6% of the sample with two or more 
disciplinary actions against them had separated from service due to a moral or legal 
infraction. The study’s analysis of in-service deviance by demographic characteristics 
found that the group with the highest risk of offending while on active duty, included 
male African-American Marines in the lower educational and aptitude categories, who 
were unmarried and underweight (based on the BMI definition).     
2. In-Service Deviance by Waiver Category 
Putka et al. augmented the existing information on pre-service offenses with data 
collected from EPSQ. They found a significant number of service members that reported 
offenses in the EPSQ but did not admit to these infractions at the time of enlistment. 
They also found that a considerable number of recruits had not committed enough 
infractions to require a waiver, thus did not receive a waiver upon enlistment.  Using this 
information, Putka et al. were able to compare incidences of in-service deviance between 
those who did not commit any pre-service offenses, those who did and received a waiver, 
and those who did but did not receive a waiver. 
In the categories of Minor Traffic and Juvenile felony waivers they found no 
statistical difference between the rates of in-service deviance across all three groups.  
While in the category of serious traffic waivers only those who committed an offense but 
did not receive a waiver had significantly higher rates of deviance.  
In the case of serious non-traffic and adult felony waivers, only those with 
waivers had a higher rate of in–service deviance than those with no transgressions.  
Recruits who used marijuana before enlisting had higher rates of in-service deviance, 
regardless of whether they received a waiver for marijuana use or not. Table 5 
summarizes some of the statistical findings of the Putka et al. study. 
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Table 5.   Rates of In-Service Deviance by Waiver Status (Marine Corps 
Sample) (adapted from Putka et al., 2004)18 






Minor Traffic Violations     
No Law Violations 3,385 4.2   
Violations-No Waiver 849 4.6   1.11   1.10 
Waiver 43 2.3   0.55   0.52 
Serious Traffic Violations     
No Law Violations 3,390 4.2   
Violations-No Waiver 189 7.9   1.99*   2.14* 
Waiver 28 10.7   2.77   2.68 
Minor Non-Traffic Violations     
No Law Violations 3,386 4.1   
Violations-No Waiver 373 6.7   1.67*   1.53 
Waiver 20 15.0   4.09*   3.55 
Serious Non-Traffic Violations     
No Law Violations 3,368 4.2   
Violations-No Waiver 201 7.0   1.73   1.79 
Waiver 173 7.5   1.87*   1.79 
Juvenile Felony Violations     
No Law Violations 3,387 4.2   
Violations-No Waiver 29 3.4   0.82   0.89 
Waiver 52 3.8   0.92   0.88 
Adult Felony Violations     
No Law Violations 3,389 4.1   
Violations-No Waiver 11 0.0 - - 
Waiver 30 13.3   3.57*   3.83* 
Marijuana Use     
No Drug/Alcohol Use 3,035 3.3   
Marijuana Use-No Waiver 562 6.6   2.05**   1.93**




                                                 
18 The asterisks indicate in-service deviance rates that are significantly different from those with no 
pre-service transgressions. * indicates significance at the 5% level (two-tailed); ** indicates significance at 
the 1% level (two-tailed). 
 eB Raw – Odds ratios without demographic controls in logistic regressions. 
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III. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A. DATA 
This section will describe the data sets used in this study as well as the source, 
scope, and sample restrictions. A description of the variable definitions for both 
dependent and independent variables of interest follows. Finally, this section will present 
descriptive statistics for accessions, waivers, and separations contained in the data. 
1. Source and Scope 
The data analyzed in this study was obtained from the Marine Corps Total Force 
Data Warehouse (TFDW).  TFDW is the Marine Corps’ official system for historical 
reporting.  TFDW’s primary function is to house data captured in periodic snapshots in 
time.  Quarterly snapshots are available from September 1997 and monthly snapshots are 
available starting in October 1997.  TFDW data is captured at the end of the month and is 
used for historical analysis, trend analysis, and reporting official strength numbers based 
on a uniform point in time.   
This study merged three separate data sets pulled from TFDW using information 
from FY 1997 to FY 2005.  A unique identification number was assigned to each 
individual in each of the three data sets.  Based on this unique identifier the data were 
merged together. The following discussion provides an overview of the three data sets as 
well as the merged data. 
The first data set analyzes active duty applicants who arrived at one of the two 
Marine Corps recruit depots from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 2006 (shippers data).  
This data set originally contained 222,426 individual observations. However, 589 
contained duplicate identification numbers, leaving only 221,837 valid observations. 
The second data set includes active duty and non-retirement separations (EAS and 
Non-EAS) during the same time frame (loss data).  This data set originally contained 
183,809 observations. However, 31,711 observations were dropped due to duplicate 
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entries for the same identification number.  There was no accurate way of determining 
the true reason for separation for these individuals, given the multiple and often 
contradictory separation entries, so these observations were dropped. 
The third and last data set includes waiver information that contains the waivers 
granted to applicants who shipped to boot camp between the beginning of FY 1997 to the 
end of FY 2005.  This data set originally included 354,578 entries with each entry 
representing a single waiver that was approved for one individual.  Because one 
individual could have multiple entries if they received more than one waiver, this data set 
was collapsed to provide a total number of waivers that each person received.  After 
collapsing this information there were 216,271 unique observations of individuals 
containing single or multiple waivers. 
The final merged data set contained 468,780 non-duplicate observations.  This 
data represented the vast majority of all active duty accessions and non-retirement 
separations from the Marine Corps from FY 1997 to FY 2005. 
2. Sample Restrictions 
After the three data sets were combined into one comprehensive database, 
unusable observations and invalid entries were addressed.  The first restriction imposed 
on the data was to reduce the sample to only those who accessed between FY 1997 to FY 
2005. Therefore, individuals who separated during this period of time (and were captured 
in the loss dataset) but had began active duty before FY 1997 were dropped from the 
analysis.   
Next, the study restricted attention to four-year contracts because they represent 
the vast majority of contracts signed by applicants.  Contracts longer than four years are 
generally given to higher quality applicants entering technical fields with longer and 
more difficult training tracks.  By including individuals who are systematically less likely 
to require a waiver in the sample, the true effects of waivers on attrition could be 
accentuated.   
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Other observations were dropped because the listed age at contract was in 
violation of the Marine Corps recruiting policy, thus representing a potential data error 
and making that observation unreliable.  Additionally, those who were separated from the 
Marine Corps due to death on active duty were removed.  Without the specific nature of 
their demise it would be impractical to attempt to correlate pre-service conduct to cause 
of death.  Table 6 provides a comprehensive breakdown of those observations that were 
removed from the final data set.   
Table 6.   Observations that Were Not Used and Why 
Number Affected Variable Action 
246,943 No Ship Data (recruits enlisting 
before FY 1997) 
Dropped 
44,532 Not 4 year Contract Dropped 
81 Separations caused by Death Dropped 
16 Enlistment age under 17 Dropped 
 
Additionally, there were several cases when individual variables obtained 
potentially incorrect information. These instances of erroneous information in an 
individual variable were all corrected by changing the erroneous entry to a missing value.  
By doing this, a particular variable would be omitted from the regressions as well as any 
tabulations but still allow other pertinent variables within that observation to be 
evaluated. Values of time in DEP exceeding 365 days were changed to missing because 
policy states that the longest an individual is allowed to stay in DEP is one year.19 
Additionally, those with negative days in DEP and individuals with negative time in 
                                                 
19 The Commanding General of MCRC can authorize an applicant up to 545 days in DEP.  However 
this does not occur as often as it appeared in the data.  This caused sufficient doubt on the validity of many 
of these entries.  Starting in FY 2007 a policy change allowed applicants to stay in DEP up to 730 days.  
However, that policy does not affect this data, since the latest observed period is FY 2005.  
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service had these entries changed to missing.20  Finally, individuals with ASVAB test 
scores that were below DoD limits for entry into any branch of the Armed Forces were 
changed to missing. Table 7 provides the complete list of the individual observations that 
were changed to missing values because they could not be verified or corrected.  
Table 7.   Occurrences and Reasons Erroneous Entries were not Used 
Number of Observations Affected Reason Variable changed to Missing 
2,896 Days in DEP greater than 365 
681 AFQT below 25  
268 Days in DEP negative 
83 Time in service negative 
48 ASVAB scores zero 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the final data set does not contain a full population 
of all active duty four-year accessions for the first three years of data.  Fiscal years 1997 
to 1999 contain a random sample of the entire accession population in those years. In 
2002 the Marine Corps changed recruiting database systems form Automated Recruit 
Management System (ARMS) to the current system MCRISS. However, data migration 
issues caused incomplete data to be extracted in the first three years of data included in 
this study.  After extensive investigation of the background characteristics of the 
accessions included for these incomplete years, the conclusion is that the included 
observations represent a random sample of the actual population and are therefore are 
valid for analysis and statistical comparison. Table 8 summarizes the number of 
accessions for each entry cohort in the dataset and a comparison of key background 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
20 Time is service is computed as the difference between the End of Service (EOS) date and the Armed 
Forces Active Duty Base Date (AFADBD). 
 31
Table 8.    Demographic Characteristics and Moral Waivers by Cohort21 
 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Accessions 7,828 7,151 12,711 25,002 26,226 26,900 23,844 23,850 23,696 177,208
Mean Age 18.79 18.76 18.41 18.71 18.83 18.80 18.71 18.88 19.02 18.79 
Female 7.88 7.30 6.88 7.28 6.86 6.77 7.05 7.24 7.31 7.11 
White22 72.02 72.49 73.00 75.09 79.23 73.51 59.88 63.01 68.84 70.56 
% Moral 
Waiver 
38.25 37.38  28.97  30.87  38.61  44.09  44.75  46.26  47.29  40.61  
% Low 
education 
4.19     4.49 3.49      4.50      3.28      2.35      1.96      3.87      3.57      3.36        
Mean 
AFQT 
56.52   55.97   56.08    55.80   56.83   58.05   58.31   57.54    57.92   57.21    
* FY 1997, 1998, and 1999 represent samples of accessions not the entire population.  
 
B. VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 
1. Dependent Variables 
To capture the multiple aspects and effects of attrition on Marine Corps manning, 
efficiency, and effectiveness, several dependent variables were examined. The first 
measure examined is the relationship between End of Active Service (EAS) separation 
and Non-End of Active Service attrition.  Typically, attrition studies focus on non-EAS 
attrition. EAS attrition is only considered when the focus of the analysis is reenlistment 
behavior. However, within the EAS population there are individuals who did complete 
their first term of service but were not allowed to enlist, for one reason or another. Since 
                                                 
21 Observed Demographic characteristics percents and averages in this table are draw from the data 
already described and are comparable to statistics found in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Military Personnel Policy tables of Population Representation in the Military service found at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/mpp.html. 
22 In this study, whites include both Hispanic and non-Hispanic ethnic groups.  The Ethnic variable 
that separates Hispanics from non-Hispanics was not captured. 
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these reasons may include in-service infractions, I chose to include these individuals in 
my definition of the dependent variable. Therefore, both those who underwent attrition 
before the end of the first term and those whose service was not satisfactory enough to be 
granted a suitable re-enlistment code were added together to produce the dependent 
variable of interest indicating unsatisfactory service. 
To identify reasons for separation I used separations codes found in the loss data 
set.  This code is given to every Marine at their time of separation and provides the 
specific reason and classification for that individual’s separation.  These codes and their 
definitions are found in the Marine Corps separations manual.  The manual contains over 
350 individual codes, with each falling under one of two separation types: EAS or non-
EAS.  Table 9 provides a breakdown of which categories were considered EAS and non- 
EAS for this study. 
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Table 9.   Description of the Dependent Variable 
Type Category Description 
Officer Enlisted Marine accepted Marine Commission 




Fulfilled contract obligation, approved early out 
Misconduct Drug, Sexual Offenses, Pattern of Misconduct, 
Unauthorized Absences, Civilian Offenses 
Recruit Entry Level Performance and Conduct (ELPAC), 
Erroneous, or Fraudulent Entry 
Unsatisfactory 
Performance 
Weight Control, Unsuitability for Service, 




Separation ordered by courts martial 
 
To identify those who completed the first term but were not allowed to reenlist, I 
investigated re-enlistment codes that did not give the recruit or the Marine Corps an 
option to continue service.   Many of these individuals were also captured in the Non-
EAS variable. However, 10.55% of those in the restricted variable were EAS separations.  
Table 10 lists the re-enlistment codes that were considered restricted for this study and 
the reason why they were assigned.  While some codes such as 3O, 3N or 3H may 
represent Marines who performed well but a single event lead to their becoming 
unqualified for retention these cases still represent a forced loss of investment, leadership, 
and generate unforeseen manning obstacles. 
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Table 10.   Re-Enlistment Codes considered as part of the Restricted Variable 
Re-Enlistment Code Reason 
3A Pro/Con Score, not eligible to re-enlist 
3B Drug, not eligible to re-enlist 
3C Other, not eligible to re-enlist 
3E Education, not eligible to re-enlist 
3F Recruit Drop, not eligible to re-enlist 
3H Hardship Discharge, not eligible to re-enlist 
3N Pregnancy, not eligible to re-enlist 
3O Refused Orders, not eligible to re-enlist 
3P Physical, not eligible to re-enlist 
4B Drugs, not eligible to re-enlist 
 
Because 52% of those who separated under Non-EAS conditions did not receive 
re-enlistment codes at all it became necessary to create a third variable that captures the 
Non-EAS and unsatisfactory re-enlistment code cases.  The unsatisfactory service 
variable does this by adding individuals with unsatisfactory re-enlistment codes to the 
Non-EAS base.  This variable was created to capture the broader definition of 
unsatisfactory service. Table 11 provides a summary of the dependent variables used in 
this study. 
Table 11.   Description of the Dependent Variables 
Variable Definition 
Non-EAS Failed to complete contract under satisfactory conditions 
Restricted Received a restrictive re-enlistments code at separation 
Unsatisfactory 
Service 
Combines non-EAS separations with those who received restrictive 
re-enlistment codes   
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2. Independent Variables 
Demographic variables such as age, race, gender, citizenship, and geographic 
enlistment region are used to control for individual background differences that may 
contribute to both the probability of having engaged in behavior requiring a moral waiver 
and potential separation.  Prior studies have found that attrition rates vary systematically 
by demographic characteristics. In addition, I also include an indicator for citizenship 
status. The military follows a policy of fast-tracking the naturalization paperwork for 
non-citizen service members.  Many wonder if this policy attracts people who are more 
interested in becoming citizens than being Marines.  The geographic variables included 
aim to control for regional differences in the youth population, local labor market 
conditions, as well as local recruiting practices.  In particular, these variables control for 
differences between the two recruiting regions, the six recruiting districts, as well as the 
difference between the 48 recruiting stations. 
Similar to previous studies, I control for the educational background and ability of 
recruits. I create a dummy to indicate that the recruit did not receive a traditional high 
school diploma. I also include AFQT scores, both as a continuous variable (in some 
models) and as mental group categories (in other models). The attrition characteristics of 
non-high school diploma graduates and lower aptitude individuals have been documented 
in a number of prior studies.  Consequently, DoD limits the number of lower educational 
tier applicants each service can access each year.   
A key variable of interest in this study is enlistment waivers.  This variable is 
broken down into several binary (dummy) variables indicating the type of waiver the 
applicant received. I also create a variable indicating the total number of waivers an 
applicant receives upon enlistment. First, the simplest breakdown of waivers is to 
separate the sample into applicants who had at least one waiver and those who needed no 
waivers to enlist.  Then, the group of recruits with waivers was further separated into 
further waiver categories, including medical, administrative, moral, and occupational 
waivers.  Moral waivers are those that involve legal issues or substance abuse.  Finally, 
the moral waiver group was divided into three major categories: (1)  substance waivers, 
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including those who received a waiver for drug or alcohol use; (2) traffic waivers, 
including major and minor traffic offenses; and (3) legal issues, which include minor 
offenses, adult and juvenile felonies and other serious law violations.23  Table 12 
summarizes the key independent variables used in this study. 
Table 12.   Description of Independent Variables 
Variable Description 
Demographic Variables 











-Responses represent Hispanic and white population groups  
-Responded as African American population 
-Race was none, Asian, Islander, or Native 
-Declined to answer Race question   
-Responded as Asian population group 
-Responded as Pacific Islander of Native Alaskan 






-Represents male applicants 
-Categorical and dummy variable representing female applicants 
Citizenship -Dummy indicating if the applicant was not a United States citizen 
at time of entree (Birth or Naturalized). 
Location  
-Categorical and dummy variable representing one of two Marine 
                                                 








Corps recruiting regions (East and West) the applicant enlisted 
from. 
 
-Categorical variable representing which one of the six Marine 
Corps recruiting districts the applicant enlisted from. 
 
-Dummy and categorical variable representing each one of the 48 
recruiting stations where the applicant enlisted  
(RS Cleveland is used as the base category in regressions) 





-Dummy created for all education levels below high school 
graduate. These include GED-recipients, those who receive 
alternative credentials, such as a certificate of attendance, 
vocational programs, and home- schooled recruits.  
 
-Continuous variable representing the AFQT score  
-Categorical variable reflecting the recruit’s mental group code 
• I – Score  93-100* 
• II– Score 65-92 
• IIIa – Score 50-64 
• IIIb – Score 31-49 






- Dummy indicating accession without a waiver 
- Dummy indicating an enlistment waiver (medical, moral, or 
administrative). 
-Variable representing the total number of all waivers applicant 
received. 
                                                 
24 In 2004, the Department of Defense re-normed the ASVAB, using the 1997 Profile of American 
Youth. The change (new scoring) is effective for any ASVAB test given after July 1, 2004. However, the 
Marine Corps did not change minimum scores. 
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-Dummy if applicant received any moral enlistment waiver. 
-Variable representing the total number of all moral waivers 
applicant received. 
 
-Dummy Variable indicating the applicant received a marijuana, 
alcohol, or other drug waiver. 
 
- Dummy Variable indicating the applicant received a serious 
traffic, minor traffic, or other minor offense waiver. 
 
-Dummy Variable indicating the applicant received a felony, 




Time in DEP 
DEP under 30 days 
 
DEP 30 to 90 days 
 
Long DEP time* 
-Applicants grouped by Fiscal Year according to the year that the 
individual shipped to recruit training (ranging from FY 1997 to 
2005).* 
 
-Dummy variable indicating the applicant spent 0 to 29 days in  
DEP before shipping to recruit training. 
 
-Dummy variable indicating the applicant spent 30 to 90 days in 
DEP before shipping to recruit training. 
 
-Dummy variable indicating the applicant spent 91 or more days in 
DEP before shipping to recruit training. 
 
* Indicates the base category in regression models 
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C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1.  Accessions 
The demographic characteristics of the Marine Corps accessions changed very 
little in the nine years of accession data included in this study.  All observed 
characteristics in the sample vary little over time.  Even after the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the demographics of Marine recruits did not change significantly.  This seems to be 
consistent with the observation that during the period of time examined in this study the 
Marine Corps never missed recruiting goals. This relatively steady supply of qualified 
applicants implies that Marine recruiters did not need to reduce accession standards to 
meet increased recruiting goals.  However, as pointed out by prior studies (CNA, 2005), 
there have been seasonal fluctuations in the demographics of accessions.  As the supply 
of DEP seniors dwindles throughout the summer months, recruiters may meet quotas 
with slightly older and less-qualified individuals who may have been unsuccessful in 
their civilian job market pursuits after graduation.  The seasonal demographic changes in 
recruitment were echoed in the seasonal fluctuations in training attrition for those who 
shipped in the months of October through May.  
While the percentage of whites enlisting has decreased slightly over the years, the 
percent of applicants who refuse to declare a race has increased from 2.7% in 1997 to 
6.7% in 2005.  Additionally, applicants reporting to be African-American have decreased 
from 15% in 1997 to 7% in 2005.  Another trend in the accessions race mixture is the 
increase in non-U.S. citizens, a number that has increased from 2.7% in 1997 to 6.7% in 
2005.  There has been no notable change in qualifying characteristics (i.e.; age, test 
scores, or educational tier) to indicating that the Marine Corps is recruiting from a larger 
pool than in previous years and is using this pool to keep recruit quality high in the face 
of a prolonged war and a strong civilian economy.  Table 13 displays the percent of 
accessions represented by these categories for the beginning, end, and midpoint of the 
time period analyzed in this study.  
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Table 13.   Percent of Accessions by Race and Citizenship Over Time  
 1997 2000 2005 Total 
White 72.02 % 75.09 % 68.84 % 70.56 % 
African American 15.45% 12.93 % 6.89 % 9.88 % 
No-Race 10.48 % 8.51 % 21.50 % 16.70 % 
Non-Citizen 2.71 % 7.14 % 6.71 % 6.84 % 
 
Another key accession characteristic is the time applicants spend in DEP.  
Applicants who spend a longer time in DEP naturally have a higher rate of DEP attrition.  
However, those who survive long DEP stays also stand a better chance of not separating 
prior to their EAS.  The correlation between spending fewer than 30 days in DEP and 
non-EAS separation is 0.027. This correlation drops to 0.004 for those who spend from 
30 to 90 days in DEP. Finally, for those who stay in DEP over 90 days, this correlation 
drops to  -0.025.  It appears that a longer DEP duration results in a self-selection of 
recruits who are more dedicated and determined to stay in service. However, some 
potentially good recruits may also attrite the longer they spend in DEP. The mean days in 
DEP appears to have decreased from 146 days in 1997 to 121 days in 2005 and the 
percent of accessions spending 30 to 90 days in DEP has increased from 19% to 26.1% in 
that same period of time. On average 59.1% of all applicants spend over 90 days in DEP 
and only 19% spend less than 30 days.  Table 14 displays the time in DEP trend in terms 
of mean days for selected cohorts. The table also displays the percentage of the pool that 
spent 0 to 29, 30 to 90, or over 90 days in the DEP before shipping to recruit training 






Table 14.   Percent and Mean Time in Delayed Entry Program for Select 
Cohorts  
 1997 2000 2005 Total 
Mean Days 145.8 148.0 120.5 149.4 
0-29 Days 25.8% 21.4% 26.8% 19.0% 
30- 90 Days 19.0% 21.9% 26.1% 21.9% 
Over 90 55.2% 56.7% 47.1% 59.1% 
 
2.  Waivers 
Applicants that require some form of policy waiver to enter the Marine Corps 
represent a significant portion of all accessions.  Over half of all applicants require a 
waiver of some sort to enlist. The waiver incidence varies by gender, as 41 percent of 
males and only 30 percent of females require a moral waiver.  The most requested waiver 
for both sexes is a substance waiver with over 35 percent of males requiring one.  The 
rate of substance waivers for females is nine percentage points lower than males while 
only five percent require a traffic or minor infraction waiver.   
While there are clear gender differences in waiver rates, there does not appear to 
be a disparity between race codes.  Whites and Hispanics require waivers (moral or other) 
at approximately the same rate as other races.   Table 15 shows the waiver rates for the 







Table 15.   Percent Waivers for all Accessions 
 Any Waiver Moral Waiver Substance Minor Serious 
Male 51.54 % 41.41 % 35.52 % 5.26 % 9.86 % 
Female 55.73 % 30.11 % 26.11 % 2.46 % 4.03 % 
White 51.73% 41.31% 35.39% 5.30% 9.72% 
Other 52.11% 38.96% 33.58% 4.51% 8.80% 
Total 51.84 % 40.61 % 34.85 % 5.06 % 9.44 % 
 
Next I investigate the AFQT scores by waiver category. In Table 16 the percent of 
waivers required appears to increase as the AFQT scores decrease.  There is a 20 percent 
point difference between the waivers required for Category I and Category IV applicants.  
The exception to this trend is seen in the moral waiver groups for category IV applicants.  
It is important to emphasize here that this data represents approved waivers.  Applicants 
who posses other attrition risk factors are far less likely to be approved for a moral waiver 
than applicants with better AFQT scores.  Subsequently, a much smaller percentage of 
category IV applicants receive moral waivers than any other group, regardless of other 
demographic characteristics.  







Substance Minor Serious 
Cat I 5,595 47.10% 36.41% 29.62% 5.99% 10.33% 
Cat II 54,189 49.77% 40.50% 34.16% 5.59% 10.62% 
Cat IIIa 49,661 52.46% 41.34% 35.51% 5.14% 9.66% 
Cat IIIb 66,127 53.11% 40.66% 35.49% 4.51% 8.36% 
Cat IV 1,628 67.20% 35.20% 34.85% 4.30% 5.22% 
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Because of geography and time, the number of waivers the Marine corps has 
granted has remained relatively stable.  Each MCD covers several states and in many 
cases parts of states, so a change in one state’s juvenile laws or reporting practices can 
have a dramatic effect on the number of waivers a particular MCD is required to consider 
in relation to other districts.  Additionally, while the Marine Corps policy has remained 
constant over this time period, each change of command at the recruiting station or 
district introduces a new interpretation of the “Whole Person” concept of waiver 
approval.  Given these factors all six recruiting districts have maintained a moral waiver 
rate between 30 to 40 percent across the nine years of this study.  Figure 1 provides a 
look at the total number of accessions and moral waivers rates for each MCD at the 
beginning, middle and end of this study as well as the over all totals.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Percent of Accessions with Moral Waivers by Marine Corps Recruiting 
District over Time 
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FY 1997 to FY 1999 represent a small sample of the accessions for those years, 
therefore increasing the probability that the disproportional decrease in waivers granted 
in these years is driven by an unclear accessions sample. This period represents a growth 
in the technology used to better identify and track juvenile offenders.  In 1995 New York 
State instituted the use of digital fingerprinting on its juvenile offenders (National 
Institute of Justice, 1995).  As more juvenile offenders are identified by this system these 
future military applicants must now request waivers that would not have been necessary 
if juvenile records were accurate.  However, this trend is not being used nation-wide and 
would not be isolated to just two districts.  No other state or Marine Corps policy changes 
have been identified that account for the disparity. 
3. Separations 
The small relative sample size of those with accurate data who underwent attrition 
and received waivers and the total population of those who successfully completed a 
contract and separated make it difficult to reach findings that are representative of the 
population.  While the cohort data set used in this study shows that 45.53 percent of those 
who separated from service did so for Non-End of Active Service (Non-EAS) reasons, 
the separation data files contained only 8,675 valid entries.  Accuracy of separation data 
was also an issue; five percent of the separations data contained duplicate entries for 
members and inconsistent separation codes.  With no way to validate which code was 
correct these entries were dropped, removing over 9,000 separations from the dataset.  
While these data shortcomings make the results non-representative of the population, 
they still generate implications for the behavior of individuals with moral waivers as 
compared to those without moral waivers. 
The distribution between EAS separations and non-EAS separations remains 
constant across gender and race demographics.  Males and females separate at nearly the 
same rate across the entire sample. As seen in Table 4 females only represent just over 7 
percent of the entire sample, meaning that even small fluctuations in categories of 
separations could cause a significant change in separation percentage. While minorities 
separate under non-EAS conditions at a slightly higher rate than the rest, they represent 
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29.44 percent of the sample, and so do not represent high absolute numbers of 
separations. Table 17 presents the breakdown of separation categories for gender and race 
across the entire sample. 
Table 17.   Rates of Separations by Gender and Race Demographics 
 Male Female White Non White Total 
Sep EAS 57.16% 59.48% 56.57% 52.89% 55.83% 
Non EAS 42.84% 40.52% 43.43% 47.11% 44.17% 
 
Separation characteristics by mental group code reflect the findings of past 
research in this area.  In this sample there is a nearly 20 percent point difference between 
the rates of non-EAS separation in category I accessions and category IV accessions.  
This information remains stable even after accounting for the fact that a far smaller 
proportion of category IV accessions with waivers were allowed to enlist. Table 18 shows 
that while the numbers in category I or IV were small the distribution between 
separations categories is consistent with previous studies.       
Table 18.    Rates and Classification of Separations by Mental Group  
 I II IIIa IIIb IV Total 
Sep EAS 62.12% 59.12% 56.15% 52.58% 46.58% 55.83% 
Non EAS 37.88% 40.88% 43.85% 47.42% 53.43% 44.17% 
Total 
Separations 
198 2,089 1,918 2,501 73 6,779 
 
The geographic distribution of separation rates also seems to be even.  The 4th 
district (Northeastern States) has the highest rate of non-EAS separations with almost 49 
percent, and the 12th District (Northwestern States) has the lowest rate of non-EAS 
separation with just over 40 percent.  With these two extremes between different 
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recruiting regions it follows that the western region has a slightly lower rate of non-EAS 
separations than the eastern region with less than one percentage point separating them.   
Table 19 gives the rates of EAS and non-EAS separations for each district as well as the 
rates for the two regions. Looking at the number of separations in each district it becomes 
obvious that, according to the data, over four times more separations are occurring from 
those that enlisted in 1st MCD than any other district.   
Table 19.   Separation Classification within Marine Corps Recruiting Districts 
and Regions as a Percent of Total Separations 
MCD Number of Separations EAS Non-EAS 
1st 3,984 56.70% 43.30% 
4th 690 51.02% 48.99% 
6th 838 54.77% 45.23% 
East Recruiting Region  5,512 55.70% 44.30% 
8th 424 55.90% 44.10% 
9th 461 54.23% 45.77% 
12th 371 59.57% 40.43% 
West Recruiting Region  1,256 56.37% 43.63% 
          
The amount of time an applicant spends in DEP before shipping to boot camp 
appears to have a significant effect on the rate at which they successfully complete 
service.  As seen in Table 20 almost 53 percent of individuals who complete less then 30 
days in DEP separate under non-EAS conditions before shipping to recruit training 
compared to only 40 percent of individuals who complete over 90 days in DEP.  This 
may partially be because of the tendency to ship the less qualified applicants directly 
while the relatively high-quality high school seniors spend more time in DEP prior to 
graduating.  
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Table 20.   Rates of Separations Characteristics by the Number of Days Spent 
in DEP Among Those Already Separated  
 EAS Non-EAS 
DEP Days 0-29 47.11% 52.89% 
DEP Days 30-90 54.21% 45.79% 
DEP Days 91+ 59.82% 40.18% 
         
D. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1. The Effects of Delayed Entree Program Time on Separations 
Classification 
As seen in Table 21 both male and female applicants have significantly higher 
moral waiver rates than their counterparts that spend over 30 days in DEP.  Over 50 
percent of male applicants that stay in DEP for less then 30 days require a moral waiver, 
which is more than a ten percentage point increase over males that spend over 30 days 
preparing for boot camp with a recruiter.  Not only do those who don’t spend time in the 
DEP require more waivers, they also separate under unsatisfactory conditions at a rate 
that is almost a full percentage point off all accessions higher than those the spend more 
than 30 days in DEP.  A one percentage point increase may not seem to be a significant 
change however, it represents a percentage of all 175,000 accessions detailing an increase 
of 1,750 unsatisfactory separations across the entire sample.  This table does not 
necessarily support the conclusion that increased DEP time alone decreases the effects of 
moral waivers on separations characteristics.  In order to isolate the effects of time in 





Table 21.   The Effects of DEP Time and Gender on Separations 
Classification Among all Accessions 
 Female Male Total 
30 or more Days in DEP    
Accessions 9,855 131,000 141,000
Any Moral Waiver 28.80% 39.52% 38.77%
Non-EAS 2.37% 1.47% 1.53%
Unsatisfactory Service 2.38% 1.56% 1.62%
    
0-29 days in DEP    
Accessions 2,519 30,700 33,200
Any Moral Waiver 36.32% 50.27% 49.21%
Non-EAS 3.45% 2.34% 2.42%
Unsatisfactory Service 3.57% 2.49% 2.57%
    
Total    
Accessions 12,400 162,000 175,000
Any Moral Waiver 30.33% 41.55% 40.76%
Non-EAS 2.59% 1.63% 1.70%
Unsatisfactory Service 2.63% 1.73% 1.80%
 
 
2. The Effect of the Number of Moral waivers on Separations 
Classification 
The number of moral waivers an applicant has does seem to have an effect on the 
likelihood that they will separate with unsatisfactory service.  As seen in Table 22, the 
increase in the rate of unsatisfactory service among those that separated with no moral 
waivers and those that had one moral waiver is 11.79 percentage points. Overall, it 
appears that as the number of moral waivers increases, so does the percentage of those 
that separate for unsatisfactory service. 
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The Effect of the Total Number of Moral Waivers an Individual has on the 
Separations Characteristics as a Percent of Separations and Accessions. 
Number of Moral 
Waivers 
Losses Unsatisfactory 




Service as a 
Percent of 
Accessions 
0 3,663 41.85    1.45   
1 1,747 53.64    2.05   
2 1,087 48.30    2.70   
3 144 65.28    2.42   
4 88 54.55    3.56   
5 37 59.46    3.15   
6 12 41.67    3.65   
8 2 50  1.23   
Total 6,780 100 1.79   
 
3. The Effect of Aptitude on Classification of Separation 
A look at waivers and unsatisfactory service rates across AFQT categories reveals 
that category I and II accessions require waivers at a similar rate as category III and IV 
accessions.  Again this data only captures waivers that were approved for individuals that 
accessed.  Consequently, based on the whole person approach to approval, a category I 
individual is more likely to have a waiver request approved than a category IV individual.  
Table 23 reinforces the legitimacy of using AFQT categories as an indicator of potential 
for quality of service.  While the rates of moral waivers do not vary significantly between 
categories, the rates of unsatisfactory service increase as the AFQT category moves from 
one to four.  
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Table 22.   The Effect of an Applicants AFQT Category on Waiver Rates and 
Separations Characteristics 








I 5,595 5.99 29.62 10.33 1.41  
II 54,200 5.59 34.16 10.62 1.66  
IIIA 49,700 5.14 35.51 9.66 1.81  
IIIB 66,100 4.51 35.49 8.36 1.89  
IV 1,628 4.30 29.55 5.22 2.40  
Total 177,000 5.06 34.85 9.45 1.79  
 
4.  Regional Effects on Separations Classification 
While the two Marine Corps Recruiting Regions access approximately the same 
number of recruits and have the similar rates of waivers, the Eastern Recruiting Region 
has a rate of unsatisfactory service that is more than four times that of the Western 
recruiting region. Table 24 shows that there is a 2.26 percentage point difference between 
the East and Western Recruiting regions unsatisfactory service rates.  This translates into 
2,017 more Marines that accessed from the Eastern Region who did not fulfill their 
contract obligations or received unsatisfactory re-enlistment codes at EAS than from the 
Western region. 
Table 23.   The Effects of Waver Category and Recruiting Region on 
Separations Characteristics as a Percent of Total Accessions 
 Accessions % Substance % Minor % Serious % Unsatisfactory 
Service 
      
ERR 89,000 35.12 4.48 9.66 2.91   
WRR 88,200 34.58 5.65 9.23 0.65   
      
Total 177,000 34.85 5.06 9.45 1.79   
 
Table 25 breaks down the total number of separations by district and compares 
the moral waiver rates of those with unsatisfactory service separations.  The rate of 
unsatisfactory service separations remains constant across all six districts and across the 
three wavier categories.  The first MCD has a significantly larger number of separations 
 51
in this sample but still maintains the same rate of unsatisfactory separations.  In total, 
over 40 percent of all unsatisfactory separations have substance waivers.  This is partially 
accounted for by the fact that substance waivers make up 34.85% of all accessions.   The 
overall rate of unsatisfactory service separations with each of the three categories appears 
to mirror the rates of accession with those waivers, indicating that recruits in these waiver 
categories do not seem to get out at a disproportionately higher rate than they access.  
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Table 24.   The Effects of Marine Corps Recruiting District on Moral Waiver 
Rates and Separations Characteristics  
Unsatisfactory Service separations 
1MCD Number of Separations 3984        100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 1838 46.13%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 131 6.12%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 916 46.01%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 229 9.34%
4MCD Number of Separations 690          100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 349 50.58%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 10 2.75%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 113 25.36%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 35 7.25%
6MCD Number of Separations 838          100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 399 47.61%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 20 5.25%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 171 37.59%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 46 8.47%
8MCD Number of Separations 424       100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 190 44.81%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 13 4.95%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 42 17.92%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 21 7.08%
9MCD Number of Separations 461         100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 226 49.02%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 33 11.71%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 104 44.25%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 23 7.16%
12MCD Number of Separations 371          100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 158 42.59%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 10 6.47%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 68 37.20%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 21 8.63%
Total Number of Separations 6768        100% 
  Unsatisfactory Service Separations 3160 46.69%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Minor Waiver 217 6.00%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Substance Waiver 1414 40.50%
  Unsatisfactory Service with Serious Waiver 375 8.69%
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Another area of interest is that substance waivers comprise the largest portion 
(34.85%) of the recruit population but represents the smallest portion (6.87%) of those 
with unsatisfactory service separations.  Serious Law waivers are the second of the three 
categories in terms of proportions of accessions (9.45%), but represent 44.75% of those 
that separate under unsatisfactory conditions. Although major traffic waivers represent 
the smallest proportion of accessions, they account for the largest percentage (63.77%) of 
those who leave for unsatisfactory service. While the marginal effect of these waivers 
does vary by race and geographic region, the cumulative effects are constant and appear 
to be significant. 
Before addressing the rate of unsatisfactory separations for those with moral 
waivers, it is important to consider how recruits with moral waivers differ from those 
without moral waivers in observable characteristics.  If there are systematic differences in 
the background characteristics of these two groups, then it is harder to attribute the 
differences in separation rates to the moral waiver alone. Table 26 presents summary 
statistics for those with moral waivers and those without. It appears that 95 % of all 
recruits with moral waivers are male compared to 92% of male non-waiver recruits. By 
dividing the difference in male representation by the standard deviation in the sample, it 
is easier to evaluate the magnitude of this difference. In this case it appears that males are 
slightly more likely to have a moral waiver than females (by 3 percentage points), but this 
difference is about a tenth of a standard deviation, and therefore quite small. Similarly, 
recruits with moral waivers seem less likely to be African American, more likely to come 
from eastern U.S., and more likely to have accessed after FY 2002. However, all these 
differences are statistically quite small. Interestingly, no differences are noted in the 
educational background of those with moral waivers and those without waivers. About 
the only significant observable difference between the two groups is the time in DEP.  
Individuals with moral waivers are far less likely to spend a prolonged period in DEP 
(more than 90 days). Overall, Table 26 shows that the differences in the background 
characteristics between the moral waiver and non-moral waiver groups not substantial.  
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Table 25.   Differences in Observed Characteristics Between Recruits with 
Moral Waivers and Recruits without Waivers25 








Gender Male 0.92 0.95 0.26 0.12 
 Female 0.08 0.05 0.26 -0.12 
Race White & Hispanic 0.70 0.72 0.46 0.04 
 Black 0.11 0.09 0.30 -0.08 
 Other 0.19 0.20 0.40 0.01 
Education Lower Education Tier  
(2 or 3) 
0.03 0.04 0.18 0.05 
DEP Less Than 30 DEP 0.16 0.23 0.39 0.17 
 30 to 90 days DEP 0.20 0.25 0.41 0.12 
 More the 90 Days 0.64 0.52 0.49 -0.23 
AFQT AFQT Cat 1 0.03 0.03 0.17 -0.03 
 AFQT Cat 2 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.00 
 AFQT Cat 3a 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.02 
 AFQT Cat 3b 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.00 
 AFQT Cat 4 0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.02 
Region ERR 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.03 
 WRR 0.50 0.49 0.50 -0.02 
District MCD 1 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.08 
 MCD 4 0.16 0.14 0.36 -0.06 
 MCD 6 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.01 
 MCD 8 0.18 0.14 0.37 -0.13 
 MCD 9 0.14 0.18 0.37 0.11 
 MCD 12 0.18 0.18 0.38 -0.01 
Year FY 1997 0.05 0.04 0.21 -0.02 
 FY 1998 0.04 0.04 0.20 -0.03 
 FY 1999 0.09 0.05 0.26 -0.13 
 FY 2000 0.16 0.11 0.35 -0.16 
 FY 2001 0.15 0.14 0.36 -0.03 
 FY 2002 0.14 0.16 0.36 0.06 
 FY 2003 0.13 0.15 0.34 0.07 
 FY 2004 0.12 0.15 0.34 0.09 
 FY 2005 0.12 0.16 0.34 0.11 
Separations EAS Separations 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.07 
 Un-Sat Separations 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.13 
 
                                                 
25 The standardized difference is computed as follows: (% Moral - % No Waiver)/ Standard Deviation.  
An absolute value difference greater then 0.25 indicates a significant difference in that particular variable 
between those with a moral waiver and those with no waivers.  
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This observation implies that in a multivariate analysis any significant findings of 
the effects of these variables on separations are more likely to be causal in nature.  This 
implication hinges upon the hypothesis that those with moral waivers and those without 
moral waivers are similar in non-observable characteristics as well. This assumption is 
necessary for attributing the differences in unsatisfactory separation rates to moral 
waivers. However, Table 26 presents an extensive number of controls, and moral waiver 
recruits appear similar in almost all these dimensions to those without moral waivers. 
Therefore, the assumption that these two groups do not differ in unobserved 
characteristics becomes more plausible. At the very least, the analysis will control for all 
variables that the literature has historically shown to affect separations.   
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IV. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
A. REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE 
SEPARATION IN THE MARINE CORPS 
1. Model Development 
A probit regression model was used to determine the effect of the independent 
variables on the likelihood of unsatisfactory service separation.26 Variables for gender, 
race, education, aptitude, and geographic location included in all models to control for 
any observable characteristics that may influence unsatisfactory separation in addition to 
enlistment waiver status. All variables, except age and number of dependants were binary 
variables.  To control for unobserved regional effects, dummy variables for each of the 
six Marine Corps Districts were used. Dummy variables for time in DEP categories were 
also included based on prior research indicating that an increased time in DEP would 
have a positive impact on quality of service.  
All models include fiscal year dummies to account for any unobserved cohort-
level differences over time.  These cohort effects are also included to control for the 
different length of time that each cohort is observed. Since earlier cohorts have spent 
more time in the service, they are at increased risk of separation, and perhaps 
unsatisfactory separation, since they have more time to offend. Finally, cohort dummies 
also try to control for the fact that the first three years of data only include samples and 
not the entire population of recruits.  To better deal with this problem, a separate 
restricted model was estimated that did not use the observations from FY 1997-1999, the 
years with incomplete accession data.   This restricted model was estimated and presented 
side by side with the unrestricted model that uses all observations from 1997 to 2005.  
                                                 
26 The probit model is defined as:   Pr(y=1|x) = Φ(xb), where y represents a binary dependent 
variable, Φ is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution, and xb represents the product of the 
parameters (b) with the vector of observed characteristics (x). 
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To avoid a possible spurious correlation between the circumstances regarding an 
individual requiring a non-moral waiver and those requiring a moral waiver, all models 
excluded individuals who required a non-moral waiver. It is unclear how the two 
categories of waivers (moral and non-moral) interact with each other. If separation is 
observed, it is also hard to attribute it to the moral versus the non-moral waiver. 
Therefore this study only looked at individuals with moral waivers as compared to 
individuals without any waivers.   
The study also used two different moral waiver models. First, the study looks at 
differences between those with a moral waiver compared to those without any waivers. 
Next, the moral waiver group was broken down into three major categories to determine 
if separations varied by type of waiver. The three major categories include: substance 
abuse, serious waivers, and minor waivers. All these categories were compared to 
individuals without any waivers.  
2. Results 
Table 27 below displays the results of the four models described above.  For each 
independent variable, Table 27 presents the regression coefficient, the standard error in 
parentheses, and the partial effect in brackets. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical 
significance, with more asterisks indicating better significance. In these models the base 
case is an 18-year old white male with no dependants, no enlistment bonus, educational 
Tier I, AFQT Category I, who spend over 90 days in DEP, accessed in FY 2005 from the 
first MCD, and had no waivers.  All marginal effects are calculated with respect to this 
representative individual. 
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Table 26.   Regression Results for Marine Corps Unsatisfactory Service 
Separations  
Dependent variable: Unsatisfactory Service Separations 
Aggregated Waiver Categories Any Moral Waiver  
Unrestricted 
Sample  
(FY97 – FY05) 
Restricted 
Sample 
(FY00 – FY05) 
Unrestricted 
Sample 
(FY00 – FY05) 
Restricted 
Sample 
(FY00 – FY05) 













Minor Waiver 0.010 
 (0.040)  
[0.000] 
-0.073 
 (0.053)  
[-0.002] 
— — 















































































Enlistment bonus -0.092 
 (0.052)*  
[-0.002] 
-0.087 
 (0.053)  
[-0.002] 
-0.095 

















AFQT Class 3a 0.076 
 (0.056)  
[0.002] 
0.084 
 (0.065)  
[0.002] 
0.076 
 (0.056)  
[0.002] 
0.083 
 (0.065)  
[0.002] 









































 (0.028)*  
[0.001] 
0.051 
 (0.024)**  
[0.001] 
0.051 
 (0.028)*  
[0.001] 
















































12th MCD -0.949 









 (0.037)***  
[-0.014] 















































































 (0.043)  
[0.001] 
Observations 136,907 113,302 136,907 113,302 
Notes: All regressions were estimated via Probit. Standard errors appear in parentheses, whereas marginal 
effects are in square brackets. Recruits with non-moral waivers are excluded from all estimations.  
* significant at 10%   ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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3. Interpretation 
According to the model in Table 27, the probability of unsatisfactory service 
separation increases by 32.8827 percent or .00562 if an applicant requires a moral waiver.  
This increase is larger than what was seen in an identical applicant who does not require a 
moral waiver in the unrestricted sample. A similar effect is seen in the restricted model 
however; this effect is slightly lower at 25.66% or .00353. Both the restricted and 
unrestricted models are significant at the one percent level. This level of significance 
indicates that there is a 99% assurance that differences in unsatisfactory separation rates 
between those with moral waivers and those without are not a result of chance.  
If the 32.88% increase in probability of unsatisfactory service separation were 
applied to a hypothetical recruit, the result would be to significantly increase the recruit’s 
chances of undergoing unsatisfactory service separation. If the base recruit has a 
predicted probability of unsatisfactory separation of 25% based on their observable 
characteristics without a moral waiver, an identical recruit with a moral waiver would 
have a predicted probability of unsatisfactory separation of 33.32%.  The 8.32 percentage 
point increase in probability represents the 32.88% increase added by having a moral 
waiver. 
When the type of moral waiver is considered it appears that minor moral waivers 
have a statistically insignificant effect on the probability of unsatisfactory separations in 
both the unrestricted and restricted models.  This seems to suggest that moral waivers 
involving traffic and minor law infractions are not an indicator of service quality. 
Alternatively, this evidence may indicate that the Marine Corps policy of evaluating the 
whole person is an effective tool for screening applicants with minor offenses.  The 
evidence seems to indicate that individuals with these types of waivers generally 
experience identical separation rates as those with no waivers. 
 
                                                 
27 All percent changes in the probability of separation are computed by dividing the partial effect by 
the observed probability of unsatisfactory service separation in the sample, and then multiplying the result 
by 100%.  
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This does not seem to hold true for those requiring serious or substance waivers.  
The model predicts that both categories of waivers significantly increase an applicant’s 
probability of unsatisfactory separation.  Substance waivers have the largest effect on the 
waiver categories. In the unrestricted model, the addition of a substance waiver to the 
observable characteristics evaluated by the model increases the probability of 
unsatisfactory service by 29.49% or 0.00504.  Again, these findings were consistent with 
the restricted model that found a 23.67 % or 0.00326 increase in probability.  These 
increases are calculated while holding constant demographic, geographic, and cohort 
characteristics.  
Individuals who received serious waivers, i.e. felonies or serious law violations, 
also had a higher probability of unsatisfactory separation. The unrestricted model 
suggests that having a serious waiver increases the odds of unsatisfactory service 
separation by 17.73% or 0.00303, while the restricted model suggests an increase of 
15.69% or 0.00216.  This effect is smaller than that of substance waivers, but still 
represents a significant finding.  In the restricted sample, the increase was significant at 
the five percent level as apposed to the one percent level seen in the unrestricted sample. 
Both levels of significance are within the realm of accepted statistical significance.  In the 
sample used in this study, a 15% decrease in unsatisfactory service separation would 
result in a real number reduction of 47428 separations involving disciplinary actions.   
B. LINEAR PROBABILITY INTERACTION MODELS 
1. Model Development 
In addition to the base model, a linear probability model was used to look at 
possible interactions between control variables.  Prior research indicated that there were 
no statistically significant interactions between key background characteristics and moral 
waivers.29 This study re-investigates this issue by estimating models with interaction 
                                                 
28 Computed as unsatisfactory separations in sample  (3,160) multiplied by the percent change in the 
probability of separation (15%). 
29 See Putka et al. (2004).  
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terms involving moral waivers and other observed characteristics. However, econometric 
research indicates that the magnitude of interaction effects estimated via probit or logit 
models may be miscalculated (Ai & Norton, 2003). Therefore, linear probability models 
(LPM) are estimated via Ordinary Least Squares instead, with the dependent variable 
indicating unsatisfactory separation and independent variables controlling for all 
observed background characteristics.  In addition, I include an interaction of the moral 
waiver indicator with one of the independent variables. For each interaction, I estimated a 
different model. These estimations were carried out for both the restricted and 
unrestricted samples. Table 28 displays the interactions that were included in the LPM 
estimations:  
Table 27.   Interactions of Moral Waivers with Independent Variables 
Interactions With No Statistical Significance 
Waiver Category  
(Substance, Serious, Minor) 
Gender, Race, Age, AFQT Category, 
AFQT score, Educational Tier, DEP Time 
Any Moral Waiver Indicator Gender, Race, Age, AFQT Category, 
AFQT Score, MCD, DEP Time 
 
2. Results 
The findings were consistent with those of Putka et al. (2004), in that no 
interactions were found to be significant. Therefore, it appears that moral waivers do not 
interact with background characteristics, such as ability and demographics, in a way that 
exacerbates or mitigates their effect on unsatisfactory separations. The only exception 
involves the interaction between substance waivers and MCDs. The findings suggest that 
substance waivers from the 1st MCD had an increased likelihood of unsatisfactory service 
separation that was statistically significant to the 1% level in both the restricted and 
unrestricted models. The results seem to indicate that there might be an additive effect on 
unsatisfactory service for accessions from the North Eastern U.S. with substance waivers. 
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This interaction is significant to the one percent level and valid even when controlling for 
all other observed characteristics included in the baseline models. 
Another significant interaction was the combination of applicants in educational 
tiers two or three who required a moral waiver. These individuals had an even higher 
probability of unsatisfactory service.  The coefficient for the moral waiver indicator in the 
LPM was 0.007, the coefficient for the lower education tier was 0.009, whereas the 
coefficient for the interaction of these two indicators was 0.004, and marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level. There seems to be some evidence that the combined 
effect of lower education and a moral waiver exacerbates the probability of unsatisfactory 
service.  One reason why the interaction term is only significant at the ten percent level 
may be due to the fact that there are only 2,827 individuals (out of 177,208) in the sample 
that posses a moral waiver and also belong in a low educational tier.    
3. Interpretation 
One key interaction that was not found to be significant was the combination of 
AFQT scores and moral waivers.  In many studies, AFQT scores and categories are used 
as a proxy for aptitude, and the positive effects of AFQT scores on the quality of service 
may suggest that the effect of a moral waiver can be mitigated by choosing higher-ability 
recruits. However, the interaction between AFQT scores and moral waivers was not 
found to be statistically significant.  This finding suggests that the mitigating effect of 
AFQT may be limited. Alternatively, this finding may be a direct result of the Marine 
Corps ‘whole person’ screening policy, which is effectively removing those with more 
than one risk factor.  An applicant who requires a moral waiver and who also has a low 
AFQT score is less likely to have the moral waiver approved than an applicant with a 
high AQFT score.  Therefore, the data at hand may not contain enough variation in 
AFQT scores and waiver categories to estimate the interaction effect.  
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C. THE EFFECT OF DRUG WAIVER ON DRUG SEPARATION 
1. Model Development 
Table 27 indicated that substance waivers had a much higher likelihood of 
unsatisfactory service separation. It is unclear though, why individuals with substance 
waivers are so much more likely to separate. It could be that these individuals re-offend 
while in service.  Given the zero-tolerance policy and random drug tests, they would be 
more likely to be caught re-offending and forced to separate. Alternatively, these 
individuals could have certain intrinsic characteristics that make them more likely to both 
use drugs and also not perform satisfactorily.  This section tries to separate these 
alternative hypotheses by investigating whether pre-service drug use is associated with a 
higher propensity for drug separation in the Marine Corps.  In order to determine the 
effect a drug waiver has on an active duty member’s propensity to separate for drug use, 
the unrestricted sample was used to ensure the maximum sample size.  The same control 
variables were used as in the base model.  The dependent variable, however, was defined 
to indicate separation from service for drug use. 
2. Results 
Table 29 presents the findings for the effect of moral waivers on drug related 
separations. The models were estimated using both the aggregate waiver categories 
(substance, minor, serious) and more detailed categories of waivers.   
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Table 28.   Results on the Effect of Pre-Service Substance Waivers on Drug-
Related Separations 
Dependent variable: Drug-related Separations 
 Aggregate Waiver Categories Detailed Waiver Categories 












Marijuana waivers — 0.149      
(0.025)*** 
[0.000625] 
Positive Drug Test — 0.214      
(0.085)** 
[0.000895] 
Other Drug Waiver — 0.186     
(0.166) 
[0.001] 
Serious Traffic Waiver — 0.184      
(0.124) 
[0.001] 
Minor Traffic Waiver — -0.001      
(0.088) 
[-0.000] 
Minor Law Waiver — -0.014      
(0.078) 
[-0.000] 
Serious Law Waiver — 0.094       
(0.050)* 
[0.000] 
Adult Felony Waiver — 0.023     
(0.176) 
[0.000] 
Juvenile felony Waiver — 0.108      
(0.111) 
[0.000] 
Female -0.283    
(0.121)**  
[-0.001] 
-0.282     
(0.121)**  
[-0.001] 
Black 0.007     
(0.062)  
[0.000] 
0.004      
(0.062)  
[0.000] 
Other Race -0.149    
(0.061)**  
[-0.001] 
-0.150     
(0.061)**  
[-0.001] 
Number of Dependents -0.006    
(0.105)  
[-0.000] 




Age -0.018    
(0.012) 
[-0.000] 
-0.016     
(0.012) 
[-0.000] 
Education Tier 2 or 3 0.174      
(0.089)* 
[0.001] 
0.179      
(0.089)** 
[0.001] 
Enlistment bonus -0.051     
(0.115)  
[-0.000] 
-0.044     
(0.115) 
[-0.000] 
AFQT Class 2 0.240      
(0.158) 
[0.001] 
0.234      
(0.157) 
[0.001] 
AFQT Class 3a 0.309      
(0.158)* 
[0.002] 
0.304      
(0.158)* 
[0.002] 
AFQT Class 3b 0.286      
(0.158)* 
[0.001] 
0.284      
(0.157)* 
[0.001] 
AFQT Class 4 0.481      
(0.246)*  
[0.004] 
0.493      
(0.245)** 
[0.004] 
0-29 days in DEP 0.145      
(0.052)*** 
[0.001] 
0.135      
(0.053)** 
[0.001] 
30 to 90 days in DEP 0.035      
(0.053) 
[0.000] 
0.034       
(0.053) 
[0.000] 
4th MCD -0.482     
(0.061)*** 
[-0.001] 
-0.477     
(0.061)***  
[-0.001] 
9th MCD -0.706     
(0.074)*** 
[-0.002] 
-0.696    
(0.074)***  
[-0.002] 
8th MCD -0.720     
(0.077)*** 
[-0.002] 
-0.714     
(0.077)*** 
[-0.002] 
6th MCD -0.524      
(0.057)*** 
[-0.001] 
-0.524      
(0.057)*** 
[-0.001] 
12th MCD -0.667      
(0.069)*** 
[-0.002] 
-0.671      
(0.069)*** 
[-0.002] 
FY 1997 Cohort 0.546      
(0.109)*** 
[0.005] 
0.513      
(0.109)***  
[0.005] 
FY 1998 Cohort 0.517      
(0.111)*** 
[0.005] 
0.496      
(0.111)*** 
[0.004] 
FY 1999 Cohort 0.512   
(0.104)*** 
[0.004] 
0.482      
(0.104)*** 
0.004] 
FY 2000 Cohort 0.415      
(0.100)*** 
[0.003] 




FY 2001 Cohort 0.436       
(0.100)*** 
[0.003] 
0.429       
(0.100)*** 
[0.003] 
FY 2002 Cohort 0.398       
(0.101)*** 
[0.003] 
0.392       
(0.102)*** 
[0.003] 
FY 2003 Cohort 0.298      
(0.108)*** 
[0.002] 
0.300      
(0.108)***  
[0.002] 
FY 2004 Cohort 0.189     
(0.112)* 
[0.001] 
0.184      
(0.112)  
0.001] 
Observations 136,907  136,889 
Probability of unsatisfactory service .0023739 .0023742 
Notes: All regressions were estimated via Probit. Standard errors appear in parentheses, whereas 
marginal effects appear in square brackets. Recruits with non-moral waivers are excluded from all 
estimations.  
* significant at 10%   ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
3. Interpretation 
Based on this model, the probability of a drug-related separation for a person with 
a substance waiver increases by 44.65% or 0.00106 over a person with no waivers.   This 
increase in probability is significant at the one percent level. Comparing this result to the 
previous chance of separation under any unsatisfactory service reason, it appears that an 
applicant with a substance waiver has a higher probability of separating for drugs than 
any other non-EAS reason. Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that a substance 
problem prior to entering military service is a strong predictor of drug-related 
unsatisfactory service separation.    
This model also shows that an applicant receiving a serious moral waiver has a 
higher probability of separating for drugs than a non-waiver applicant.  Having a serious 
waiver increases the probability of a drug related separations by 32.44% or 0.00077 
(significant at the five percent level). This indicates that there may be a link between 
behavior that leads to both drug use and serious legal problems. The model did not 
identify a link between adult felony waivers and drug separation, but that is most likely 
due to the fact that there were only 657 observations with adult felonies in the sample.    
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This increase in probability of a drug related separation is also evident for those 
that enlisted under marijuana waivers. There is a 26.33% or 0.000625 increase in the 
probability of drug-related separation for individuals who required at least one marijuana 
waiver at enlistment. This increase is also significant at the one percent level and 
represents the largest single portion of moral waivers issued by the Marines Corps. In this 
sample 48,918 or the 71,963 individuals who required a moral waiver were marijuana 
waivers.   
The moral waiver group that demonstrates the largest increase in drug-related 
separation required a waiver because they failed a drug test.  This relatively small group 
representing 4,396 of the 71,963 applicants who required moral waivers represented a 
37.70 % or 0.000895 increase in drug-related separations. The Marine Corps primary tool 
for identifying in-service drug use is the Command-screening program that requires all 
commands to randomly test between 10 to 40 percent of their Marines in a given year.30  
This is the same drug test that applicants failed upon enlistment that prompted them to 
receive a moral waiver for substance use.   
                                                 
30  For a complete description of the DoN drug testing program refer to OPNAVINST 5340.4. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Effects of Waivers and the “Whole Person Concept” 
The evidence in this study indicates that the ‘whole person’ concept is working 
for individuals that require traffic or minor law waivers to enlist.  Additionally, it appears 
that individuals with both moral waivers and low aptitude or educational attainment are 
being screened adequately. However, the data does seem to indicate that those who enlist 
with moral waivers are more likely to separate for unsatisfactory service. In addition, 
those who receive drug waivers separate at a significantly higher rate than comparable 
individuals without those waivers.  This suggests that the whole person concept may be 
missing key indicators of unsatisfactory service.  Adjusting the policy of treatment of 
recruits that enter with moral waivers may save the Marine Corps substantial effort and 
money in the recruitment, training, and separation process of those who fail to meet 
performance standards.  Not having to re-recruit a replacement for a Marine that was 
identified as having a significantly greater chance of not meeting their service obligation 
would ease some of the burden on the recruiting force.   
2. The Effects of Drug and Serious Waivers on Drug Separations 
The link between pre- and in-service behavior is most easily drawn for the case of 
drug use. It is harder to link pre-service offenses in other areas with any in-service 
behavioral and legal problems. In addition, the military’s drug screening policies make it 
much easier to identify in-service infractions, relative to other behavior involving other 
(possibly illegal) activities. The study finds that individuals who receive drug waivers are 
more likely to use drugs while in service. However, the study also identifies a strong link 
between drug-related separations and individuals with serious law waivers. It could be 
the case that serious legal problems occur concurrently with drug use, however, at 
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enlistment the serious legal problem takes precedence. Alternatively, it could be that 
individuals with serious moral waivers have inherent behavioral problems that make 
them more likely to also use drugs.  
It should be noted, though, that although the findings suggest that moral waiver 
recruits have a higher marginal propensity of unsatisfactory separation, in absolute terms, 
the majority of them are fitting Marines who complete their duties and careers 
satisfactorily.  In light of these findings, this study recommends a policy that would allow 
for faster separation of individuals that come in with moral waivers to decrease the 
negative effects of unsatisfactory service separations. It is possible that by removing or 
providing preventive counseling to these higher-risk Marines may save money and create 
incentives for not re-offending while in service.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Enlistment Contracts for Moral Waiver Applicants that Provide an 
Alternate Separation Process  
The administrative separations option for those designated as high risk should be 
placed in the hands of the battalion commander level. Moral waiver approval should be 
contingent on the applicant agreeing to immediate voluntary separation at the 
commander’s discretion if they are found guilty of re-offending once on active duty.  
This provision should be triggered by either a conviction by courts marshal or Non-
Judicial Punishment (NJP), but would not alter the right of the accused to appeal or 
request a courts marshal and would not restrict due process.  This would be an 
administrative separation with the nature of discharge reflecting that decision. Wiping the 
slate clean for these applicants after a waiver is approved may not be in the best interests 
of the Corps.  
There may be several legal issues that would require further research into this 
proposition. The contract would not alter the Marine’s right to appeal any finding of guilt 
or remove their right to ask for a review by the board of Naval Corrections.  Also the 
classification of separation would still be considered administrative and not pose any 
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undue hardship of the Marine after separation.   Additionally, a comprehensive review of 
current DoD and DoN separations policies would need to be performed to ensure 
consistency with those directives.   
Providing an expedited means for separation would not necessarily mean that a 
unit would receive replacements faster.   Commanders would still have to weigh the costs 
and benefits for their unit of creating a vacancy in manning that may not be filled for an 
extended period of time.  Units that receive high priority for manning issues may receive 
replacements in a very short period of time, units that as considered pro-share31 may have 
a gap until the next scheduled replacement arrives.   Expedited separation may not fill 
gaps any faster but it will provide commanders with the option to remove individuals 
who may negatively contribute to the morale and teamwork of a unit.   
 The overriding goal of this proposal is to give operational commanders another 
tool to deal with Marines that have already been given a second chance. These Marines 
were not only given the opportunity to correct their past deviance; they were also 
assigned mentors and taught the correct path while being exposed to the Marines Corps 
core values.  Those that have been given the privilege of being a Marine and choose to re-
offend should, at the commander’s discretion, be removed from the ranks before they can 
corrupt others. 
2. Preventive Counseling in the Marines Area of Previous Offense  
The data suggests that there is a strong link between an individual’s pre-service 
transgression and unsatisfactory service separations. Once the high-risk waiver categories 
have been identified, those who require those waivers could be asked to agree to 
additional counseling as a condition of the waiver approval. Often Marines move through 
the training pipeline and no one in their chain of command is aware that this Marine is at 
risk of drug or criminal involvement until it is too late. Identifying the high-risk Marine 
 
 
                                                 
31 See Appendix D for an explanation of the Marine Corps Manning and Staffing precedence levels.   
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to commanders before they get into trouble would give leaders a chance to send the 
Marine to preventive counseling, provide extra mentoring, or place them on a monitoring 
program to head off trouble.   
This policy, however, may unfairly label those who honestly admitted to pre-
service transgression with a scarlet letter of sorts.  If abused, young Marines with waivers 
could be subject to prejudgment or limited opportunity by leaders who may come to 
believe that it is only a matter of time before they re-offend. However, strict privacy 
policies and command involvement could mitigate any undue negative effects along these 
lines.  This policy would also reinforce the separation of a Marine if they choose to re-
offend after preventative counseling.    
3. Additional Testing to Identify Non-Observable Risk factors 
Psychological and personality testing could be instituted in order to monitor 
previously unobserved characteristics of quality of service.  This process would be 
similar to the current Marine Corps Exit and Retention Census. To identify additional 
factors that are correlated with behavioral problems and drive the quality of service, all 
new accessions could be subjected to a battery of personality and physiological tests. 
These tests would aim to identify intrinsic values and characteristics that may be 
correlated with service quality.  The current observable characteristics used to identify 
high-risk recruits only include demographics and cognitive factors. However, recent 
studies have been increasingly stressing the effect of non-cognitive factors on job market 
performance. In addition, current waivers provide only a crude measure of behavioral 
problems that may not be comparable across individuals. For instance, an applicant 
requiring a marijuana waiver who comes from a middle-class family in very liberal 
community with a very permissive approach to marijuana use does not necessarily posses 
the same propensity toward deviance than an applicant who requires the same waiver but 
comes from a more conservative society and family with strict anti-drug views.  Clearly, 
the second individual may posses a stronger tendency toward deviant behavior as their 
drug use was in stark contradiction to their sociological norms, while the first applicant’s 
drug use was consistent with the norms they were exposed to.  
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Testing for psychological and non-cognitive factors may pose a significant 
monetary challenge.  However, due to the centralized nature of recruit processing, the 
Marine Corps would only need to establish two testing sites.  Additionally the time 
required for testing could be small enough to fit into the processing phase of recruit 
training without the loss of valuable training days.  Although the interpretation and 
analysis of this data may require extensive manpower analysis, the potential benefits in 
decreased attrition and increase in the overall quality of service could outweigh the initial 
costs of investigating underlying factors that predict quality service.  
4. Recommended Areas for Further Study  
Further study that examines the overall quality of service more closely by 
factoring in proficiency and conduct scores as well as fitness report data would provide a 
more complete picture of service quality.  In addition, replications of this study would be 
beneficial, given the data shortcomings described earlier.  
 In addition, it may be necessary to study survival rates of Marines with moral 
waivers, in order to identify the highest risk periods in a Marine’s career and help target 
efforts to reduce unsatisfactory service separations.  A Naval Postgraduate School Thesis 
research done by CPT Christopher Distifeno on the United States Army indicates that 
soldiers with moral waivers actually have lower attrition rates through the first year of 
service when compared to non-waiver soldiers.  However, this research also shows that 
moral waiver soldiers do attrite from the operating forces at higher rates after the first 
year of service. This study estimates that soldiers with moral waivers have a 4 percentage 
point higher attrition rate in the first term of service (Distifeno, 2008).  Determining the 
Marine survival function could allow commanders to provide help at the most critical 
times in a Marine’s career.  
Further study would also be required to identify any legal issues associated with 
expediting the separation process.  While preliminary research indicates that instituting 
an alternate separation process for Marines with moral waivers can be accomplished 
within the bounds of current DoD, DoN, and Uniform Codes of Military Justice statues, 
further research into possible case law and political issues is needed.  This research 
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would also need to be done with respect to a specific policy. While alternate separation 
policies may be generally feasible, the specific details of that policy may trigger 
unforeseen due process issues.     
Another area of study that could help focus efforts to reduce unsatisfactory 
service separation may be found in a study of duty station assignments and quality of 
service indicators.  It is possible that assigning Marines with a high risk of unsatisfactory 
service to areas with high crime or gang activity may be affecting the likelihood of that 
Marine re-offending.  If a link between duty station assignment and decreased service 
quality could be established, new assignment or intervention policies could be developed 
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APPENDIX A. GUIDE LIST FOR TYPICAL OFFENSES 
1. Minor Traffic Offenses (Coded as Minor Waivers) 
• Blocking or retarding traffic.  
• Careless driving.  
• Crossing yellow line, driving left of center.  
• Disobeying traffic lights, signs, or signals.  
• Driving on shoulder.  
• Driving uninsured vehicle.  
• Driving with blocked vision.  
• Driving with expired plates or without plates.  
• Driving without license in possession.  
• Driving without registration or with improper registration.  
• Failure to have vehicle under control.  
• Failure to keep to right or in lane.  
• Failure to signal.  
• Failure to yield right-of-way.  
• Faulty equipment (defective exhaust, horn, lights, mirror, muffler, signal device, 
steering device, tailpipe, windshield wipers, and so forth).  
• Improper backing: backing into intersection or highway; backing on expressway; 
backing over crosswalk.  
• Improper blowing of horn.  
• Improper parking: restricted area, fire hydrant, double parking, (excluding 
overtime parking).  
• Improper passing: Passing on right; in no-passing zone; improper lane change; 
passing stopped school bus with flashing lights; pedestrian in crosswalk.  
• Improper turn.  
• Invalid or unofficial inspection sticker; failure to display inspection sticker.  
• Leaving key in ignition.  
• License plates improperly displayed or not displayed.  
• Racing, drag racing, contest for speed.  
• Speeding.  
• Driving wrong way on one-way street.  
• Failure to stop for or yield to pedestrian.  
• Following too closely.  
• Operating overloaded vehicle.  
• Zigzagging or weaving in traffic.  
NOTE: Consider offenses of similar nature and traffic offenses treated as minor by local 
law enforcement agencies as minor traffic offenses.  
 
 
2. Serious Traffic Offenses (Coded as Minor Waivers) 
• Driving with suspended or revoked license or without license.  
• Leaving scene of accident (single vehicle) involving no personal injury and  
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• Failure to comply with officer's directions.  
• Reckless driving (Fines $200 or less). 
  
3. Class 1 Minor Non-Traffic Offenses (Coded as Minor Waivers) 
• Curfew violation.  
• Disturbing the peace.  
• Drinking liquor or alcoholic beverages on train, plane, or other conveyance.  
• Drinking in public (non-disorderly)  
• Dumping refuse near highway, littering.  
• Liquor or alcoholic beverages: unlawful possession, consumption in public place, 
or open container.  
• Mischief (painting water towers, graffiti, throwing water-balloons).  
• Purchase, possession, or consumption of alcoholic beverages by minor (underage 
drinking).  
• Trespass on property (non criminal).  
• Violation of fireworks law.  
• Violation of fish and game laws.  
 
4. Class 2 Minor Non-Traffic Offenses  (Coded as Minor Waivers) 
• Abusive language under circumstances to provoke breach of peace.  
• Altered identification (driver's license, birth certificate, and so forth), when intent 
is to purchase alcoholic beverages.  
• Committing or creating nuisance.  
• Disorderly conduct: creating disturbance, boisterous conduct.   
• Spinning wheels, improper start.  
• Property damage is under $1000.  
• Loitering.  
• Damaging road signs.  
• Disobeying a summons, or failure to pay a fine.  
• Fighting, participating in a brawl.  
• Illegal betting or gambling: operating illegal handbook, raffle, lottery, punch 
board, watching cockfight.  
• Juvenile non-criminal misconduct: beyond parental control, incorrigible, runaway, 
truant, or wayward.  
• Possession of indecent publications or pictures (other than child pornography  
• Theft, shoplifting (value $100 or less): only if committed under 16 years of  
• Unlawful assembly.  
• Vagrancy.  
• Vandalism: injuring or defacing public property or property of another; $200 or 
less.  
NOTE: Consider offenses of a similar nature as minor non-traffic offenses.  
In doubtful cases, apply the following rule:  
If the maximum confinement under state or local law is 6-months, or less, treat the 
offense as a Class 2 minor non-traffic offense. 
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5. Serious Offenses (Coded as Serious Waivers) 
• Adultery.  
• Carrying concealed weapon; possession of brass knuckles.  
• Check, worthless, making or uttering, ($500 or less).  
• Conspiring to commit misdemeanor.  
• Contempt of court (includes non-payment of child support or alimony required by 
court order).  
• Failure to appear, failure to comply with a judgment, failure to answer (or 
offenses).  Shooting out street lights; or similar offenses where damage is 
assessed at Assault consummated by battery.  
• Child pornography offenses.  
• Contributing to delinquency of minor (includes purchase of alcoholic beverages).  
• Criminal trespass.  
• Desecration of grave.  
• Discharging firearm through carelessness or within municipal limits.  
• Driving while drunk, impaired, intoxicated, or under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.  
• Drunk and disorderly and related offenses.  
• Failure to stop and render aid after accident.  
• Fornication.  
• Indecent exposure.  
• Indecent, insulting, or obscene language communicated directly or by telephone.  
• Killing domestic animal.  
• Leaving scene of accident (multiple vehicle) involving no personal injury and  
• Property damage is under $1000.  
• Liquor or alcoholic: unlawful manufacture or sale.  
• Looting.  
• Malicious/criminal mischief: throwing rocks on highway, throwing missiles at 
athletic contests, or throwing objects at vehicle.  
• Petty larceny; embezzlement (value $500 or less).  
• Possession of marijuana under 30 grams or steroids (requires District waiver)  
• Prostitution/Solicitation.  
• Reckless driving (when fine assessed is $201 or more).  
• Removing property under lien.  
• Removing property from public grounds.  
• Resisting arrest, fleeing and eluding.  
• Selling, leasing, or transferring weapons to minor or unauthorized individual.  
• Slander.  
• Shooting from highway or on public road.  
• Stolen property, knowingly receiving (value $500 or less).  
• Theft, shoplifting (value $500 or less). (If under age 16 and value is $100 or less, 
treat as class 2 minor non-traffic offense).  
• Unlawful carrying of firearms; carrying concealed firearm.  
• Unlawful entry.  
• Negligent homicide.  
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• Use of telephone to abuse, annoy, harass, threaten, or torment another.  
• Vandalism: injuring or defacing public property or property of another; over 
$200.  
• Willfully discharging firearm so as to endanger life; shooting in a public without 
owner's consent (if intent is to permanently deprive owner of vehicle, consider as 
grand larceny under felony offenses below).  
• Check, worthless, making or uttering ($501 or more)  
• Wrongful appropriation of motor vehicle; joyriding. 
NOTE: Consider offenses of comparable seriousness as serious offenses. Apply the 
following rule: If the maximum confinement under state or local law exceeds 6-months 
or is equal to or less than 1-year, treat offense as a serious offense.  
 
6. Felony Offense  (Coded as Serious Waivers) 
• Aggravated assault; with dangerous weapon; assault intentionally inflicting great 
bodily harm; assault with intent to commit felony.  
• Assault and battery on law enforcement officer or child under 16 years of age.  
• Arson. 
• Attempt to commit felony.  
• Breaking and entering (all types).  
• Bribery. 
• Bigamy.  
• Burglary.  
• Carnal knowledge of child under 16. Criminal libel.  
• Draft evasion.  
• Extortion.  
• Forgery; knowingly uttering or passing forged instrument (except for altered 
identification for purchase of alcoholic beverages).  
• Grand larceny; embezzlement (value $501 or more).  
• Housebreaking.  
• Illegal drugs (See table 3-16 for determination of eligibility).  
• Impersonating a police officer, civil official, military officer.  
• Indecent acts or liberties with child under 16, molestation.  
• Indecent assault.  
• Kidnapping, abduction.  
• Leaving scene of accident (single or multiple vehicle) involving personal injury 
and/or property damage is over $1000.  
• Mail matter: abstracting, destroying, obstructing, opening, secreting, stealing, or 
taking.  
• Mail, depositing obscene or indecent matter.  
• Maiming; disfiguring.  
• Manslaughter.  
• Murder.  
• Obstructing justice.  
• Pandering.  
• Perjury.  
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• Public record; altering, concealing, destroying, mutilating, obliterating, or 
removing.  
• Rape.  
• Robbery.  
• Sodomy.  
• Theft, shoplifting (value over $500).  
• Riot.  
• Sedition; soliciting to commit sedition.  
• Stolen property, knowingly receiving (value over $500).  
NOTE: Consider offenses of comparable seriousness as a felony. In doubtful offense as a 
felony cases, apply the following rule:  
If maximum confinement under state or local law exceeds 1-year, treat as a felony 
Are the applicant's demonstrated qualities indicative of successful service as a Marine?  
Is the applicant's enlistment/reenlistment clearly in the best interest of the Marine Corps?  
If there is any doubt, or the answer to any of the above questions is "no," a request for a 
waiver should not be processed. This decision must be made without regard to monthly 
production goals. 
 
8. No Waiver Considered (Do not appear in Sample) 
 
• Underage. 
• Failure to meet ASVAB standards. 
• Alien without proper USCIS documentation. 
• Does not possess a social security card or other required verifying documents. 
• Charges filed or pending, or any other unresolved judicial proceeding (to include 
pre-trial intervention or diversionary programs sanctions), resulting from an 
alleged violation of state, local, Federal, or territorial statutes . 
• Applying as an alternative to judicial proceedings. 
• Under criminal restraint or serving a sentence. 
• Felony (excluding felonies involving single incident). 
• Ninety days have not elapsed in cases involving: 
o Early release from parole or probation (See Note(s) 
6A & 6B). 
o A period of confinement served as the result of a 
court's sentence (except for confinement served as 
punishment for conviction of non-felonious traffic 
related/traffic offenses by state statute i.e. Driving 
while drunk, impaired, intoxicated, or under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs). 
o As confinement served in lieu of payment of fine 
for minor non-traffic offenses.)  
• Any criminal charges pending to include traffic violations against the applicant. 
• Intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of application or 
at any stage of processing. 
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• Questionable moral character, history of alcohol or drug dependency/addiction, 
sexual perversion, history of anti-social behavior, body piercing, offensive 
branding, offensive tattoos, body mutilation or chronic, frequent, or active 
venereal disease or herpes.   
• Trafficking, selling or trading illegal drugs (Including Cannabis). 
• Court conviction, either as an adult or as a juvenile, for more than one 
• A court conviction, adverse juvenile court adjudication, or self-admittal 
• A conviction of any offense involving drugs (except simple possession 35 grams 
or less of cannabis or steroids).prescription drugs. 
• A history of psychotic disorders, or a state of insanity at the time of application. 
• Homosexual conduct, which is defined as a homosexual act, a statement by the 
applicant that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, 
or a homosexual marriage or attempted marriage. 
• Claims prior service but is unable to present written evidence. 
• Receives retired or retainer pay from any branch of the Armed Forces. 
• Receives disability compensation from any Federal or other agency/source. 
• Conscientious objector or person with beliefs or convictions which would 
interfere with unrestricted assignments, regardless of Selective Service 
classification. 
• A draft evader, including a person who receives a presidential pardon for draft 
evasion. 
• A doctor, dentist, theologian, or graduate student pursuing a course of study 
leading to one of these professions. 
• A member of any other naval or military organization or Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) (other than the Marine Corps), Federal or state, active or reserve (including 
the National Guard) unless they present a valid, completed conditional release, 
DD Form 368, from their service or unit, as appropriate, and ship direct or enlist 
into a Marine Corps component of equal or greater mobilization potential. 
• Applicants with 3 or more dependents (including illegitimate) children are not 
eligible for enlistment into the USMC. Applicants with 4 or more dependents 
(including illegitimate) children are not eligible for enlistment into the USMCR. 
• In DEP felonies. 
• Driving convictions involving drugs other than cannabis, steroids, and 
• Individuals with 10 or more Class 2 non-traffic offenses or 6 or more 
• Prior service Marine reenlistment applicants who have any post enlistment serious 
offenses or a combination of 1 felony and 4 serious offenses. 
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APPENDIX B. WAIVER AUTHORITY LEVELS 
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APPENDIX C. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING COMMANDS 
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APPENDIX D. MARINE CORPS MANNING AND STAFFING 
PRECEDENCE LEVELS 
1) Excepted Command: Excepted commands will be manned and staffed at 100 
Percent of chargeable table of organization and equipment (T/O&E) by grade 







2) Priority Command:  Priority commands will be manned and staffed at 95 
percent of chargeable T/O&E by grade and MOS.  They will be staffed at 100 





3) Proportionate Share (Pro Share) Command: Pro share commands are those 
units, other than Excepted or Priority that will receive fair share apportioned 
manning and staffing.  Pro share units will absorb manning and staffing 
fluctuations as structure requirements and inventory change. 
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